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ABSTRACT
This study examines Confederate nationalism in Western North Carolina during the Civil
War. Using secondary sources, newspapers, civilian, and soldiers‟ letters, this study will show
that most Appalachians demonstrated a strong loyalty to their new Confederate nation. However,
while a majority Appalachian Confederates maintained a strong Confederate nationalism
throughout the war; many Western North Carolinians were not loyal to the Confederacy.
Critically analyzing Confederate nationalism in Western North Carolina will show that
conceptions of loyalty and disloyalty are not absolute, in other words, Appalachia was not purely
loyal or disloyal.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................................... iv
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................................ v
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 1
CHAPTER ONE: THE CONFEDERACY IN WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA ................................... 23
CHAPTER TWO: COMPETING LOYALTIES, WESTERN NORTH CAROLINIAN DESERTION ... 56
CHAPTER THREE: WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA OPPOSITION TO CONSCRIPTION ............... 85
CHAPTER FOUR: DISLOYATLY AND UNIONISM IN WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA ............. 106
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................... 137
REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................................... 146
Manuscripts ........................................................................................................................................... 146
Newspapers ........................................................................................................................................... 146
Published Primary Sources ................................................................................................................... 147
Secondary Sources ................................................................................................................................ 148

iii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: North Carolina County Map .......................................................................................................... 6
Figure 2: 1860 slave populations in North Carolina ..................................................................................... 9
Figure 3: Convention vote in Western North Carolina. .............................................................................. 14

iv

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Slave Populations and Slave Holders by County. ......................................................................... 11
Table 2: Number of Churches in Western North Carolina ......................................................................... 35
Table 3: 1862 Gubernatorial Election. ...................................................................................................... 111
Table 4: 1864 Gubernatorial Election. ...................................................................................................... 127

v

INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 1860, Western North Carolinians watched anxiously as the secession crisis
deepened throughout the South. With the election of Abraham Lincoln seemingly imminent,
most Appalachian citizens were not inclined to consider secession from the Union.1 For the most
part, Western North Carolinians did not view President Lincoln‟s election victory as reason to
secede from the Union. Holding firm to their belief that the institution of slavery was protected
by the United States Constitution, most in the region remained unmoved by the new president.
But the events of April 12, 1861, destroyed the hopes of many that North Carolina could avoid
secession. Looking on as the battle raged in Charleston Harbor, Western North Carolinians were
shocked when the Lincoln administration called for 75,000 volunteers to invade the new
Confederate States. After months of standing firm with the Union, Appalachian citizens were
now ready to become Confederates. The once ardent Unionist William Holden summed up the
sentiments of many when he wrote in his newspaper, the North Carolina Standard that “the
proclamation of Mr. Lincoln has left no alternative but resistance or unconditional submission.
The Southern man, who would quietly submit to the doctrines enunciated in that document, is
only fit for a slave.” Western North Carolinians‟ transition from Unionist to Confederates took
shape with rapid speed. Months of holding out against secession eroded in a mere matter of days.
Appalachian citizens viewed Lincoln‟s call for troops as a threat to their communities. The fear
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of an invasion gave credence to the months of campaigning by secessionists. North Carolina
responded to Lincoln‟s call for troops by seceding on May 20, 1861. 2
Lincoln‟s reaction to Fort Sumter created a groundswell of Confederate patriotism in
Western North Carolina and throughout the entire state. Approximately 130,000 North
Carolinians would enlist into Confederate service, 24,000 (eighteen percent) of these men came
from Western North Carolina. In total, 40,000 North Carolinians would die in Confederate
service. The tremendous sacrifices of Confederate soldiers and their subsequent failure to win
independence created a quandary for Civil War historians. Throughout the twentieth century,
historians juggled the problem of understanding Confederate nationalism in the face of the fact
that the Confederacy lost the war. Contending with the reality that the Confederacy failed to
achieve independence, many historians argued that Confederate nationalism in the South was not
strong enough to win a war. Thus, they have concluded that an inherent deficiency in the
southern will to win the war aided the United States in their victory over the South. Until the
mid-1990s many historians concluded that the Confederacy lost the Civil War because they
lacked the will to win. Historians were prone to argue that internal dissent within the South
claimed the life of the Confederacy. They argued that the Confederacy was destroyed from
within by a southern populace who were disgruntled over the war. However, towards the end of
the twentieth century, some historians began to reconsider and challenge the internal dissent
thesis. In 1997 Gary Gallagher, in The Confederate War, argues that although “class tensions,
unhappiness with intrusive government policies, and war weariness all form part of the
Confederate mosaic, they must be set against the larger picture of thousands of soldiers
2
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persevering against mounting odds, and civilians enduring great human and material hardship.”
Gallagher makes a point, that despite the apparent internal fissures, most southerners were loyal
Confederates. He argues that historians have too often “worked backward from Appomattox.”
The Confederate War revitalized a stagnant historiography and paved the way for more complex
studies of identity and nationalism in the Confederacy.3
Although historians who support the internal dissent thesis continue to provide
contributions to the Confederate nationalism historiography, historians following in Gallagher‟s
footsteps have begun to consider more complex and nuanced understandings of Confederate
nationalism.4 Historians have started to understand that it was quite possible for southerners to be
disgruntled with the Confederacy, but simultaneously support the cause. Signs of dissent among
civilians and soldiers do not necessarily equate to a failure of an individual‟s Confederate
nationalism. Accepting that the Confederacy had adopted the loyalties of a substantial portion of
the southern population has allowed historians to engage in more complex studies over how
southerners identified with the Confederate nation. Moving away from older debates over the
existence of nationalism in the Confederacy, many historians now recognize that most
3

Terrell Garren, Mountain Myth: Unionism in Western North Carolina. (Spartanburg: Reprint Company, 2006),
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southerners identified with the Confederacy, however, their commitment to the Confederacy was
not necessarily equal or constant. Recognizing that Confederate nationalism existed throughout
much of the Confederacy has allowed historians to take on more intricate studies on how
southerners perceived their new nation. Working within this robust historiography, this study
attempts to contribute further to the historical understanding of Confederate nationalism.
Showing that Confederate nationalism existed among most Western North Carolinians, this study
will demonstrate that their loyalty was not without dissent. In their effort to prosecute the war,
the Confederate government was bound to have conflicts with the southern populace. However,
southerners were capable of expressing their dissent toward the Confederacy while still hoping
and/or fighting for Confederate victory.5
In between these facets of loyalty and disloyalty, there were southerners who lay
somewhere in the middle. In other words, not all southerners were ardent Confederates or
Unionists. One cannot assume that all southerners fit neatly into either a category of “loyal” or
“disloyal.” In his study on the North Carolina Piedmont, historian David Brown explains that
North Carolinians, “just like countless others across the South, did not fit neatly into either one
of these positions.” He continues to explain that wartime “situations can elicit an extraordinary
level of sacrifice and unshakeable commitment, but for every southerner who was staunchly
Unionist or Confederate,” there were others lying the middle. Western North Carolinians, as with
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Piedmont North Carolinians and most other southerners, reacted to the war differently,
expressing varying degrees of loyalties. Historians have begun to come full circle in our
understanding of loyalty and disloyalty. Although southerners may have had a national identity,
not all were equally loyal.6
Shortly after Lincoln‟s call for troops, almost all Western North Carolinians quickly
transitioned from Unionists into Confederates, creating a new Confederate American identity for
themselves. But, in order to understand why Appalachian Confederates decided to fight for the
Confederacy, it is pertinent to have an understanding of how and why they identified with the
Confederacy‟s cause. This study attempts to dissect and uncover the nature of Confederate
identity in Western North Carolina. As the figure below shows, this study classifies Western
North Carolina as the twenty-six most western counties in the state (see fig. 1).7 In recent years,
historians have begun to focus their works on single communities or regions. Studying only one
region, Western North Carolina, will provide a more clear understanding of how Appalachian
citizens understood their national identity. Additionally, studying Confederate nationalism on a
regional or state level provides a more concise picture of how communities interpreted the war.
Historian Andrew F. Lang explains that “Local studies provide a color and texture to the larger
Confederate experience and serve as a practical and effective means of approaching larger
historiographical problems.” He concludes that focusing on one area can “illuminate the
complexities and nuances of the larger story of Confederate nationalism.” An in-depth study of

6
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Appalachia during the Civil War is revealing of how citizens and soldiers struggled to maintain
their national identity while preserving their communities and homes.8

Figure 1: North Carolina County Map
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Appalachian citizens became Confederates because they believed it was the best way to
protect their homes, communities, and way of life. Lincoln‟s call for troops created a sense of
urgency and fear among Western North Carolinians. A belief that fighting for the Confederacy
was the best way to protect their homes would be at the forefront of their identity. This new
Confederate identity in Western North Carolina was a conglomerate of varying loyalties. Almost
fifty years ago, David M. Potter noted that:
Historians frequently write about national loyalty as if it were exclusive, and inconsistent
with other loyalties, which are described as "competing" or "divided," and which are
viewed as detracting from the primary loyalty to the nation. Yet it is a self-evident fact
that national loyalty flourishes not by challenging and overpowering all other loyalties,
but by subsuming them all and keeping them in a reciprocally supportive relationship to
one another 9
Potter‟s analysis pins down how Confederate nationalism existed in Western North Carolina.
The citizens of Appalachia had many different loyalties prior to the Civil War. First and
foremost, loyalties lay with their families, and extended outward to their community and state.
Andrew F. Lang explains that nationalism “was an intricate combination of local and state
loyalties that functioned simultaneously and were fused together with adherence to the actual
nation.”10 Appalachian Confederates chose to fight for the Confederacy because they perceived
the imminent Union invasion of the South as a threat to their homes and communities. Western
North Carolinians viewed the Confederacy as the best way to protect their homes.
Before one can understand how Western North Carolinians understood their new national
identity, it is important to have a concrete understanding of the secession crisis in North

9

David M. Potter, “The Historians use of Nationalism and Vice Versa” The American Historical Review 67 (July,
1962): 932.
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Carolina. During the secession period, Western North Carolinians would maintain a slightly
greater commitment to the Union than other areas within the state. The region‟s persistent
Unionist feelings can be attributed to two factors that were exclusive to Western North Carolina.
Sharing borders with four states, Appalachia was coherent of the events going on in the
surrounding states. As their neighbors slowly exited the Union one by one, many mountain
residents chose to wait and see how the secession events would unfold. Historian John Inscoe
contends that geography “remained a central factor in shaping the debate in Western North
Carolina. Living in the only section of North Carolina that bordered all four of the state‟s
neighbors, mountain residents were particularly sensitized to developments in those neighboring
states.” Sharing their longest border with East Tennessee made many citizens weary about the
potential conflicts that could emerge between the two states. With much stronger Unionist
feelings, many Western North Carolinians were foreboding of a potential conflict between the
two regions.11
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Figure 2: 1860 slave populations in North Carolina

Although geography of the region played a role in influencing the attitudes of some
Western North Carolinians, the politics of slavery in the region also had a strong sway over
Appalachians‟ feelings. From its beginning, Western North Carolina always had a minimal slave
population, which can largely be attributed to the reduced anxiety highlanders expressed over
Lincoln‟s election and the fear over emancipation. Of the 331,059 slaves living in North
Carolina, only 37,313 (eleven percent) resided within the Appalachians.12 Most Western North
Carolinians did not believe slavery‟s existence was endangered by the election of the Lincoln,
arguing that slavery “was far safer within the Union and protected by constitutional

12

University of Virginia, “Historical Census Browser.” University of Virginia Library,
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guarantees.”13 In 1860, Appalachia would have far fewer slaves than the rest of the state (see fig.
2).14 Unlike neighboring regions, slavery in Western North Carolina “made up a considerably
smaller proportion of the populace than was true for most of the South.” In Western North
Carolina, slavery was much more diluted than other areas of the South, with most slave owners
only owning one or two slaves. In his study, John Inscoe found that eighty-three percent of
slaveholders owned fewer than ten slaves. As the table below reveals, slaveholders made up only
a small minority of the region‟s free population. The numbers also reinforce Inscoe‟s findings
that most slaveholders in the mountains rarely owned more than two slaves (see tab.1).15 Because
of its geographical differences from the plantation belt, Western North Carolina was destined to
have fewer slaves than other areas within the state and the South. With an elevation that did not
favor the production of cash crops such as cotton or tobacco, Western North Carolina would
become a region filled with yeomen farmers. However, the region would also become a center
for manufacturing and mercantile production. Western North Carolinians would develop an
economy unique from the rest of the state. Despite the limited slave population, many small
farmers did still depend on slave labor. Throughout the region, subsistence farmers depended on
seasonal slave labor on their farms. Allowing for non-slaveholders to borrow slave labor helped
insure slavery would remain an integral part of Appalachian society.16

13

Inscoe, The Heart of Confederate Appalachia, 49.
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, “The Geography of Slavery” University of North Carolina School of
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Table 1: Slave Populations and Slave Holders by County.
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Beginning in the early 1830s, the Whig party gained a foothold in the mountains that
remained intact through 1860. Appalachia was a mixed region of subsistence farmers as well as
mercantile, manufacturing, and tourism operations. Unlike neighboring regions of the plantation
South driven by cotton production, Western North Carolina had a diverse economy which
“separated southern highlanders by the late antebellum era.” Appalachia was a distinctive
“section of North Carolina, with priorities, goals, and needs unlike those of other parts of the
state.” Recognizing that the mountains had different needs from the rest of the state, Whigs
capitalized on the opportunity to win the loyalties of highlanders. Inscoe explains that far more
“significant to Western North Carolinians than either free suffrage or ad valorem taxation in both
popularity and long-term impact were internal improvements. The Whigs‟ strong endorsement of
government funding and sponsorship of various transportation projects led the majority of
mountain voters into the party in the late 1830s.” Seeing the success of the Whigs, Democrats
began to advocate for internal improvements as well. This strategy was effective in winning over
many voters, but Whigs would continue to maintain a slight majority over the Democrats in the
region. The debate over secession and southern rights in the mountains fell along these
traditional party lines. Within North Carolina, pro-secession advocates were generally from the
Democratic Party, while Unionists emerged from the former Whig Party. Because Whigs had a
slightly greater hold over mountain voters, enthusiasm for the Union was reflective of their
dominance in Appalachia.17
During the secession crisis, North Carolinians participated in two official votes, which
both played a role in delaying the state‟s exit from the Union. Additionally, the outcomes of both
17
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votes reveal that persistent Unionist sentiments remained resilient in Appalachia during the
secession conflict. The first vote was for the president of the United States in the 1860 election.
The split between secessionist and Unionist sentiments seen during the vote underlined how
Appalachian citizens were nearly divided over secession. In North Carolina, the race for the
presidency quickly boiled down to a two-man race. North Carolinians were divided between the
pro-southern rights candidate, John Breckinridge and the Constitutional Unionist, candidate John
Bell. In the end, the pro-South candidate John Breckinridge won the electoral votes from North
Carolina, narrowly defeating John Bell. Throughout the whole state, Breckinridge only defeated
Bell by 848 votes, receiving 50.4 percent of the vote. Western North Carolina mirrored the vote,
with the region nearly split between Bell and Breckinridge. The close election results underline
how North Carolinians were torn between pro-Secession and pro-Unionist convictions. But
despite the popularity of both candidates in North Carolina, neither would come close to winning
the presidency. The divided electoral votes in the South hindered its ability to affect the outcome
of the election, allowing Abraham Lincoln to win.18

18

James McPherson, Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001), 137;
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Figure 3: Convention vote in Western North Carolina.

Secessionists in the state house and senate hoped that the election of Lincoln would
bolster secessionist sentiments in the state. In hopes of this surge, they prepared a bill calling for
North Carolina to vote on whether to call a secession convention. The bill stipulated that North
Carolinians would vote on February 28, to decide whether to have a convention. The results of
the convention vote reveals how deeply divided North Carolina had become in the spring of
1861. The surge in secessionist enthusiasm hoped for was not enough to pass the convention bill.
Although secessionists won forty-seven of the eighty-two North Carolina counties, they narrowly
lost the popular vote. In total, 94,009 North Carolinians cast ballots, of which 47,338 (fifty-one
percent) voted against the bill. Unionists won the vote by a narrow 667 votes. In Western North
14

Carolina, the margin of the Unionists‟ victory was slightly greater. Of the 26,962 voters in
Appalachia, 15,825 voted against the bill. Unionists carried the day by a margin of fifty-eight
percent. Within Western North Carolina, twelve counties voted to have a convention, while
fourteen opposed the bill (see fig. three).19 The victory of Unionists in Appalachia is revealing of
how Western North Carolinians viewed secession before the firing on Fort Sumter. Unshaken by
Lincoln‟s election, North Carolinians had decided to wait out the secession crisis, hoping for an
eventual reconciliation of the Union. But events soon to come changed the attitudes of nearly all
North Carolinians. After South Carolina fired on Fort Sumter, Western North Carolinians
watched in anxiety for the response of the United States, but “it was Lincoln‟s response three
days later that ended any complacency or reluctance on the part of the vast majority of
conditional Unionists in the region.” John Inscoe explains that the Unionist allegiance to the
United States was based upon the belief that if North Carolina stayed in the Union, they could
avoid a war. In Western North Carolina, Unionists insisted that the “government‟s use, or even
the threat, of military force was foremost among the conditions that would lead them to abandon
their devotion to the Union.” The response of the United States after Fort Sumter forced most
Appalachian citizens to reevaluate their allegiances.20
The Lincoln administration‟s reaction to Fort Sumter rang the death knell for Unionist
holdouts in Western North Carolina. With the calling up of 75,000 volunteers, President Lincoln

19

Kruman, Parties and Politics in North Carolina, 276-277; University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, “North
Carolina Maps,” University of North Carolina Libraries,
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20
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ended the secession debate in Appalachia. Unionists in Western North Carolina could no longer
support the United States in the face of a Union invasion of the South. This study begins at the
period when secession ended, and patriotism for the Confederacy took over Western North
Carolina. By the late spring of 1861, Appalachians would send thousands of their sons and
fathers into the Confederate army. But, the tremendous level of support and patriotism expressed
at the war‟s start would be put to the test as the war intensified. While many Western North
Carolinians would remain ardently loyal to the Confederate nation, many others would suffer
moments of doubt, questioning their will to achieve independence. The pain and torment
associated with the conflict would force many to questions the validity of their new nation.
Western North Carolina‟s experience during the secession crisis and the Civil War set the
region apart from its neighbor, East Tennessee. After the attack on Fort Sumter, support for the
Confederate nation still garnered only mild support among East Tennesseans. While President
Lincoln‟s gathering of troops to invade the South sparked an outpouring of Confederate
patriotism in Western North Carolina, no such surge occurred in East Tennessee. John Inscoe
notes that while “Carolina highlanders quickly capitulated to their state‟s secessionist majority
after Fort Sumter and Lincoln‟s call for troops, East Tennesseans maintained a far more
determined and effective Unionist leadership.” Throughout the late spring and early summer of
1861, Western North Carolinians rallied to the Confederacy, mobilizing men and material for
war, yet East Tennesseans remained largely against the Confederate cause.21
In June of 1861, twenty days after North Carolina had seceded, Tennessee finally left the
Union. But this decision was without the support of most East Tennesseans. Led by vocal leader
21
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William Brownlow and Andrew Johnson, almost seventy percent of East Tennesseans voted
against the ordinance, whereas Central and West Tennessee passed the ordinance with well over
fifty percent margins. Of the thirty-one East Tennessee counties, only six passed the secession
ordinance. In his study on the region, Todd Groce concludes that Tennessee Appalachians
“simply did not share the seperationists‟ fears that Lincoln posed a threat sufficient enough to
warrant the dissolution of the Union.” Although most East Tennesseans rejected the
Confederacy, a significant minority did embrace the new nation. The region would remain under
Confederate control until August 1863 when the region‟s center, Knoxville, fell to Union
General Ambrose Burnside on September 1, 1863. With the fall of Knoxville, the minority of
Confederates in East Tennessee fled the region, finding refuge in North Georgia, and Western
North Carolina. Looking for reprisal against Confederate loyalists, Unionists East Tennesseans
would join with the Union army in tormenting the few remaining loyalists. By late 1863, East
Tennessee would be a Unionist stronghold and remain that way for the rest of the war. 22
Unlike East Tennessee, Western North Carolina remained in Confederate control
throughout the war. Although being plagued with violence, much of which came from Unionist
East Tennessee, Confederate authorities maintained command in the region until the spring of
1865. Unionism did exist in North Carolina, but it was not near to the extent that existed in East
Tennessee. Western North Carolina during the Civil War looked less like East Tennessee and
more like the rest of North Carolina. The North Carolina Mountains had much more in common
with the state‟s Piedmont region, described by David Brown. Like the Piedmont, Appalachia
22
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would remain largely loyal to the Confederacy, but it did have significant elements of dissent and
disloyalty.23
This study sets out to understand Confederate nationalism in Appalachia by detailing the
fluidity of morale and loyalty throughout the war. Divided into four chapters, this work reveals
that Western North Carolina was a complex region, neither completely loyal nor disloyal, but
rather somewhere in the middle between these poles. Confederate nationalism in Appalachia was
in reality much more blurred than historians have perceived. Throughout the war, a majority of
Western North Carolina actively supported the Confederacy, while others dissented against the
Confederacy. In between these two groups, another faction of Western North Carolinians
included a cross section of men and women who may have at times expressed disaffection
against with Confederacy, but simultaneously hoped for southern independence.
The first chapter establishes how Western North Carolinians understood their national
identity. Central to their identity, Appalachian Confederates believed they were fighting to
protect their homes. The United States call for volunteers after Fort Sumter created a fear that a
northern invasion into the Appalachians was probable. Although protecting their homes and
communities was the integral part of their identity, this chapter will reveal that the Western
North Carolinian will to fight was also supported by multiple other motivating factors. Religion,
revolutionary patriotism, and slavery were also important reasons behind why Appalachian
Confederates fought, and continued to fight throughout the Civil War. Viewing the war as one
that they had tried to avoid at all cost, Lincoln‟s raising of troops induced Western North
23
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Carolinians to believe they were fighting against an invader. Therefore, they concluded that they
were the righteous side. Throughout the war, Appalachians invoked the power of God to aid
them in their quest for independence. Additionally, as battlefield losses increased, most Western
North Carolinians would respond by praying more fervently than before. Revolutionary
patriotism would serve a similar purpose for Western North Carolinians. Mountaineers believed
that they were fighting in a war similar to that of the Revolutionary War. Revolutionary
patriotism, like religion, would remain strong throughout the war. Even as defeat loomed over
the Confederacy, Western North Carolinians compared their dire situation to the Revolution,
where American patriots faced similar struggles. Lastly, this chapter will demonstrate that
although slavery was not near as vibrant in Appalachia as it was in the lower South, many
Appalachian Confederates would still fight to defend it. Although most did not own slaves,
Western North Carolinians still had many reasons to fight for the institution. Slavery provided a
hierarchical society that few, if any, white highlanders were willing to give up in exchange for
racial equality. Even Appalachian citizens who did not own slaves still benefited from slave
labor. Often borrowing or renting slaves whenever they needed extra help, many nonslaveholders
still prospered from slavery.24
The second chapter will explore the desertion problem that began in Appalachia shortly
after the war started, and slowly increased as the war dragged on. Understanding Confederate
desertion is an important part of any understanding of Confederate nationalism because it is
generally understood by historians as an indicator of disloyalty and dissent. This chapter will
reveal that Appalachian desertion happened for two general reasons. First and foremost, some
24
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highlanders deserted shortly after the war began. This was primarily because they lacked the will
to fight. However, not all deserters can be placed into this category. The central reason that most
Appalachian Confederates chose to fight for the Confederacy was for the protection of their
homes. Ironically, this same reason also encouraged many to desert. Many Western North
Carolinians would desert not because of a lack of will, but instead because their families were in
jeopardy at home. The Confederacy‟s inability to protect, sustain, and secure the home front
while men were off at war caused many Confederates to desert. This chapter will show that not
all deserters were necessarily disloyal.25
Chapter Three will examine the national Conscription Acts which were imposed on
Western North Carolina and the rest of the Confederacy. Examining conscription in Western
North Carolina is revealing of the sacrifices that many mountain citizens were willing to make
for the Confederacy. Conscription was not initially met with fierce opposition; the new act
actually garnered mild support from some in the region. But as counties were swept dry of
needed manpower, whatever initial support the bill had, quickly eroded. This chapter
demonstrates that opposition to conscription in the mountains was based on the fundamental
belief that Western North Carolinians had no other men to supply. The Confederacy‟s inability to
provide for families in the absence of their men, forced many to complain to the North Carolina
government that conscription was harming the region. However, these expressions of dissent
were not necessarily reflections of disloyalty. Much of the antagonism between the North
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Carolina government and citizens on the home front emerged because Appalachian residents
believed that they had no more men to provide to conscription officers.26
As the war waged onward, disloyalty and re-birth in Unionism slowly began to occur
among a minority of Western North Carolinians. Chapter four looks at loyalty and disloyalty in
North Carolina and their effects on the two gubernatorial elections. The 1862 and 1864
governor‟s races provide a glimpse of how Appalachian citizens viewed the Confederacy and the
war effort. Although, the 1862 election would be between two candidates who both vowed to
prosecute the war and achieve independence, the 1864 election would not be so simplistic.
Throughout 1863, an increase in weariness over the war allowed for open discussion for peace
negotiations and paved the way for a peace candidate to run for governor. The gubernatorial
election of 1864 would be between a candidate who favored peace and one who favored war.
The 1864 election would serve as a referendum on the war; North Carolinians would have a
choice to continue the war, or opt for peace. In 1864, the peace candidate for governor, William
Holden would be thoroughly defeated by incumbent Governor Zebulon Vance. When North
Carolinians voted to send Vance back for a second term, they also voted to continue the war. But
the rise of the peace movement in North Carolina underlines how disloyalty slowly increased in
the state. Furthermore, it demonstrates how within North Carolina, a significant minority of
society rejected their Confederate identity. 27
Throughout these chapters, it will be shown that Confederate nationalism existed in
Western North Carolina, but at times many struggled with war weariness and the effects of
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burdensome Confederate policies. The result is that Confederate morale in the region fluctuated
throughout the war. Among the loyal population, many dissenters existed, but although they
complained about the war, their desire to see the Confederate nation succeed was still quite
strong. However, as the war went on, the will of many Western North Carolinians would not be
strong enough to withstand the conflict. Violence and starvation in Appalachia would persuade a
significant minority that the Confederate cause was not panning out. This study reveals that
Western North Carolina had elements of both loyalty and disloyalty. While many held firm to the
Confederate ideology no matter how harsh their surroundings, others would not be willing to
make the same sacrifice.

22

CHAPTER ONE: THE CONFEDERACY IN WESTERN NORTH
CAROLINA
By the spring of 1865, the Confederacy was teetering on the brink of collapse. But
despite the imminent peril, many Western North Carolina Confederates still held out hope. In a
March 15, 1865, letter home, Captain Benjamin Justice wrote to his wife, “I do not despair. Out
of greater gloom. The God of our fathers delivered them in the days of the first revolution His
hand is not weak and his arm is not short that He cannot save us in our perils.” Most Western
North Carolinians believed they were fighting a war against tyranny and their cause was
supported by God. Justice‟s statement reveals the complicated fusion of revolutionary patriotism
and religious righteousness that many Western North Carolinians felt. Justice had been
soldiering for four long years and was desperate to come home to North Carolina, but despite his
longing for home, he remained in the army. In this letter, Justice revealed his reasons for staying
in the army. He stayed because he believed God was on his side in a fight against an enemy who
sought the destruction of his home. Looking back to his Revolutionary forefathers, Justice found
strength by comparing the Confederacy‟s perilous situation to that of the Americans during the
Revolutionary War. 28
This chapter will examine how Western North Carolinians evolved into Confederate
soldiers and citizens. Confederate identity in Appalachia was made up of three main concepts;
revolutionary patriotism, slavery and religion. The first portion of this chapter will show how
Western North Carolina soldiers understood their fight for independence as a cause similar to the
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American Revolution. Just as the Continental army fought to protect their homes from an
invading army, Western North Carolinians believed they were doing the same. Identifying with
the Revolutionary war, Appalachian Confederates considered their cause to be a second war for
independence. Although Western North Carolinians rarely addressed the topic of African
slavery, they ironically believed they were fighting against their own enslavement from the
North. While most North Carolinians believed they needed to protect the peculiar institution,
evidence from the period shows that it was rarely referred to as a motivating factor for fighting.
The second part of this chapter will reveal that although slavery was rarely spoken of, it was still
an integral motivation to fight. The third portion of this chapter addresses the significance of
religion in Confederate identity and popular will. Religion helped many Appalachian men and
women endure the hardships of war as well as justify the losses of men on the battlefields. This
chapter will reveal how Confederate identity in Western North Carolina was a complex makeup
of many different beliefs. However, even in the face of many different motivations to fight,
Appalachian Confederates always held their right to defend their homes at the core of their
identity.
Most North Carolinians only joined the Confederate cause after President Abraham
Lincoln called up troops in response to the attack on Fort Sumter in April of 1861. Holding firm
to their faith that the Constitution of the United States could protect their values, the majority of
North Carolinians continued to be Unionists after Lincoln‟s election. It was only the calling up of
volunteers to subdue the rebellion in the deep South that inspired most Western North
Carolinians to join the Confederacy. In his study on the Appalachian Confederate, Walter Lenoir,
historian William L. Barney explains that it was not the bombardment of Fort Sumter that
24

excited Western North Carolinians; it was the “proclamation” that followed. Barney states that
southerners “viewed Lincoln‟s proclamation as a declaration of war and a call for the invasion of
their homes, the abolition of slavery, and the end of the liberties they held dear.” Lincoln‟s call
for troops ruined hopes for peace among Western North Carolinians. Aaron Sheehan-Dean found
that similar to Western North Carolinians, Virginians also became “ardent Confederates in
response to what they perceived as Lincoln‟s duplicity. The anger of betrayal, the sting of honor
insulted, and the fear of northern intentions transformed many reluctant secessionists into eager
rebels.” Prior to Lincoln‟s proclamation, many Western North Carolinians believed the Unionist
stance to be the position to achieve peace, but the North‟s reaction to Fort Sumter change nearly
all Unionist perceptions in Appalachia.29
Historian Marc Kruman contends that most “North Carolinians believed that Lincoln‟s
election was an insufficient cause for secession. They felt that the political system could benefit
themselves too and not just northerners.”30 For the majority of Western North Carolinians, the
victory of the Republicans in the 1860 election did not constitute a reason to secede. And even
the corresponding attack on Fort Sumter was expected by most Western North Carolinians.
However, after the attack on Fort Sumter, Lincoln‟s reaction validated the secessionist argument
that an invasion of the South was imminent. In their work The Heart of Confederate Appalachia,
John Inscoe and Gordon McKinney conclude that “Lincoln‟s response three days later ended any
complacency or reluctance on the part of the vast majority of conditional Unionists in the
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region.”31 Most Western North Carolinians felt that they were pushed into a fight by a northern
aggressor who wanted to invade their state and home. For Western North Carolinians, the war
was always held in the mindset of the southern defender against the northern invader; the
righteous against the unrighteous.32
In his study on Ashe County volunteers, Martin Crawford writes that the raising of
United States troops was interpreted as an invasion of the South which “not only challenged the
independence of the new Confederate nation; but it simultaneously threatened the security of the
local community and the homes and families of its individual members.” Crawford explains that
Lincoln‟s request for troops was viewed not only as an attack on the Confederacy, but for
Western North Carolinians, it was an assault on their homes and communities.33 An early war
article in the North Carolina Standard attempted to encourage more men to enlist and those
already in service to reenlist when the author stated, “The honor, the liberty, the rights and the
property of the South are too dear to be compromised […] Let the people rally to the standard of
the country—let them drive back the foe, and strike for their homes and their fire sides with
tenfold vigor.”34 The purpose of this article was to motivate those still at home to join and those
already in the army to continue fighting, therefore the key words the article used to inspire
volunteering are important. The article‟s use of “home” and “fireside” is significant because it
alludes to the necessity to protect the local community. However, the use of the word “fireside”
even goes beyond the local community and into the actual home. The fireside is often imagined
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as the core of the family home; a place where all members gather to socialize. To protect one‟s
fireside would mean to protect one‟s immediate family. One Western North Carolina man from
Alleghany County described these sentiments in a letter to the newspaper, Spirit of Age. H. B.
Williams wrote that “Our fighting men have volunteered almost to a man. Our sons are in the
service; our neighbors have, many of them, left their wives and little children, some of them
extremely limited circumstances, and gone forth to peril their lives and fortunes to protect their
homes and fireside.”35 Williams describes a mountain community that had depleted nearly every
able man for service. But perhaps what is most significant is Williams‟ conclusion that all those
who joined the army did so to protect their “firesides.” In his pivotal book For Cause and
Comrades, James McPherson notes that the belief that southerners were fighting for their home
was an incredibly powerful source of motivation; he states that “For Confederate soldiers a more
concrete, visceral, and perhaps powerful motive also came into play: defense of home and hearth
against and invading enemy.”36 In other words, each man was fighting for his country and his
state, but above all, they believed they were fighting for their families and homes.
Because Western North Carolinians were fighting in what they believed to be a defensive
war, they understood that in this aspect, their conflict was similar to the Revolutionary war. They
believed that the North, by invading the South, was usurping the power of the central
government, and in effect destroying democracy. Therefore the recalling of the American
Revolution and the Founding Fathers by Confederates emerged from the belief that the
Confederacy was fighting to protect democratic government. Western North Carolinians, like all
35
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Confederates, idealized the Confederacy for what they believed to be its defense of democratic
principles. James McPherson explains that the “invocation of the Founding Fathers was as
common among Confederate volunteers as among their Union counterparts—for an opposite
purpose. Just as the American Patriots of 1776 had seceded from the tyrannical British empire,
so the Southern Patriots of 1861 seceded from the tyrannical Yankee empire.”37 By proclaiming
themselves to be following in the footsteps of their ancestors, Confederates attempted to
proclaim themselves as patriotic Americans fighting for independence from a tyrannical North.
Additionally, because England invaded the colonies, comparing themselves to the
Revolutionaries proved to be another way show that they were fighting a defensive war.
Historian Benjamin Carp explains that both Confederates and Revolutionaries perceived
themselves as being threatened by an outside invader. The threat to the local community in both
the Revolutionary war and Civil War South created a common enemy that communities could
rally against. Carp notes that the “Revolutionary and Confederate leaders articulated common
interests that justified the formation of a new nation, encouraged nationalist sentiment among the
nation‟s citizens, and mobilized soldiers and civilian supporters to defend the nation.”
Populations in Colonial America and the Antebellum South were similar in that both of them had
a “common interest” in protecting their local communities from an invading army. A national
identity was created because everyone throughout the state and the South had the same interest in
protecting their homes. Because of these similarities, many Western North Carolina
Confederates voiced a connection to their revolutionary forefathers.38 Western North
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Carolinians‟ belief in the similarities between their cause and the Revolution proved to be quite
resilient throughout the war. Even as battlefield losses were published, many Confederates took
comfort in the fact that George Washington‟s Continental army experienced similar failures. An
article published in the Greensboro Patriot explained to its readers that “With the examples of
the reverses which befell our ancestors in a contest with a superior foe, during a war of seven
years, why should we be discouraged at the temporary advantages of our enemies.” 39 By
comparing themselves with the Revolutionaries, the article simultaneously claims the North to be
an invading army, which was done by associating it with England.
From the beginning of the war, and until the spring of 1865, Appalachian citizens
associated themselves and the Confederate cause to the Revolutionary war. Shortly after the
Fourth of July in 1863, A.B. Cox, a chaplain in the 22nd North Carolina from Ashe County wrote
a letter to the Spirit of the Age. Cox stated that “The 4th of July is not celebrated here to-day; all
is quiet in Raleigh. We hope that under other circumstances the day will be remembered as on
former occasions. We are engaged in the second struggle for independence.” Although Chaplain
Cox does not describe specifically why the holiday was not celebrated, it was likely because
many associated it with the United States, therefore celebrating it could be construed as
Unionism. However, Cox does conclude that he hopes to remember the Fourth of July for the
Revolutionary war. His statement, similar to the one made by Captain Justice demonstrates that
both men clearly believed that North Carolina was engaged in a new war for independence.
However, what is more revealing is the connection made with the American Revolutionary War;
both men made a distinct connection with their revolutionary forefathers. Many communities
39
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throughout Western North Carolina felt they were sending their finest men off to fight for their
independence, just as the colonists did in the Revolution. At the flag presentation for
Mecklenburg county volunteers, the presenter, J. J. Williams drew special significance upon the
first Revolution in a speech to a Western North Carolina crowd:
Eighty six years ago, the citizens of Mecklenburg of which Union was then a part,
smarting under insults and wrongs of British oppression, solemnly declared their
connection with the British crown forever dissolved. […] we have endured „till
endurance is no longer a virtue‟ and now only is left us the alternative of
becoming the abject slaves of the North, or asserting our independence by an
appeal to arms. Never was a cause more just; our rights, our liberty, our all hang
trembling in the balance.40
Similar to Chaplain Cox, J.J. Williams drew a direct connection between the American
Revolution and the war for Confederate independence. By directly linking the Revolutionary war
and the Civil War, Williams was able to draw a parallel between the North and England. The
American Revolution was believed by both North and South to be a war for freedom and against
tyranny. Therefore, when Williams drew a connection between the Revolution and the Civil
War, this underlined how Western North Carolinians viewed themselves.
Many Western North Carolinians looked back on their Revolutionary ancestors for
guidance in their new conflict and some were driven to fight because they believed the North
attempted to enslave the South. In his speech cited in the previous paragraph, Williams argued
that not taking up arms would result in Southerners becoming “abject slaves.” His insistence that
not fighting would result in white slavery shows how many southerners believed that if the North
won, they would destroy southern society and revoke the freedom of whites.41 For Confederates,
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to be enslaved meant they would lose to their state and individual sovereignty and thus be
subservient to the will of the North. James McPherson contends that many Southerners were
motivated to fight because they believed the North was trying to make slaves of white
Southerners. McPherson went onto explain that “Southern recruits waxed more eloquent about
their intention to fight against slavery than for it—that is, against their own enslavement by the
North.”42 Much of the southern will to fight was grounded in a belief that they were fighting a
war of self defense. For Southerners, a northern victory would mean utter subjugation and
slavery under the arm of the United States. In an early 1861 letter to the Western Democrat, the
writer stated that “the question now is, will we be free or must we be slaves? […] All the South
should be united. We will all be subjugated and made slaves, if we are not united.”43 In late
1864, Benjamin Justice made an almost identical conclusion in a letter to his wife. As the
conflict waged on, Justice had become exhausted by war: “My spirit and my heart are weary of
the dire and turmoil of war. But do not suppose that I would have peace on other terms than the
entire independence of the South […] the latter was trampled underfoot by the unscrupulous
tyrant who seeks to enslave us.”44 Justice‟s declaration underpins much of the sentiment
prevalent among Western North Carolina soldiers and citizens.
Many Appalachian men and women felt that they were fighting for their independence
from an army seeking to “enslave” them. In a letter to the North Carolina Standard, one
anonymous woman of North Carolina attempted to motivate support for the troops by
articulating exactly what North Carolina soldiers were fighting against, “Remember when you
42
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are sleeping in your downy beds, they walk and stand hour after hour, in snow, rain and sleet,
that you may not be enslaved—that no proud force may drag you forth to a life of shame and
wretchedness.” The author‟s use of the word “enslaved” is significant because it places the
consequences of Confederate defeat into the harshest possible outcome. The use of the word
“enslaved” is done to convey to her readers that if the Southerners lost the war, not only would
they lose their independence but they would also lose their individual freedoms. The author then
reminds her readers of the American Revolution, encouraging them to find strength in those who
came before, “Look back to the days of the first Revolution—remember what sacrifices our
grandmothers made—then tell me, if in their glorious spirit of self-abnegation and consecration
to the cause of human liberty, we have not been greatly blessed.”45 The author identifies the
Confederacy‟s national sacrifices with the sacrifices made by those of the Revolution;
insinuating that Confederates and Revolutionaries were both fighting for the same thing,
freedom. The parallel drawn by the author reveals how Confederates drew a special connection
with the ideals of the Revolution, and they attempted to project those same ideals onto their own
cause for independence. The fear of white enslavement expressed by so many Confederates often
went hand in hand with their Revolutionary sentiments. McPherson notes that “soldiers were
using the word slavery in the same way that Americans in 1776 had used it to describe their
subordination to Britain.” Therefore, exercising their belief that Northerners were attempting to
enslave them, simultaneously worked to enforce their belief that they were following in the steps
of their Revolutionary past. 46
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Although Western North Carolina Confederates spoke much more of their fear of white
enslavement than they did their fear of African emancipation, this does not mean that slavery
was not a motivating factor to fight. Most Confederates rarely spoke directly on the issue of
slavery because they associated it with their freedoms. In other words, Confederates felt they
were fighting to protect their families and their freedom, but part of that freedom included the
right to own human property. McPherson explains that “Slavery was less salient for most
Confederate soldiers because it was not controversial. They took slavery for granted as one of the
Southern „rights‟ and institutions for which they fought, and did not feel compelled to discuss it.”
Although slave populations in Western North Carolina were only minimal, slavery was still an
instrumental reason for fighting. For nonslaveholding Appalachian Confederates, like
nonslaveholding Virginians, the biggest reason to support “slavery rested on the advantages of
racial supremacy. Being white immediately conferred on even the poorest family a measure of
respect and acceptance that the most successful free blacks would have had trouble establishing.”
Western North Carolinians were well aware of the benefits slavery offered to their status within
antebellum society, and they were not willing to give up that status symbol.47
Besides offering a hierarchical society, which poor whites embraced, many nonslaveholders often had access to slave labor. Although non-slaveholders may not have had their
own slaves, they could often rent and occasionally borrow slave labor from the local slave
owner. Throughout the region, non-slaveholding yeoman farmers depended on local slave labor
periodically during the year. Nearly all large slaveholders in the region partook in slave hiring
which as John Inscoe argues, “enabled a large segment of the region‟s non-slaveholding or very
47

McPherson, For Cause and Comrades, 110; Sheehan-Dean, Why Confederates Fought, 18.

33

small slaveholding populace to benefit directly from the available black labor source.” Western
North Carolinians recognized that a northern victory would mean the emancipation of slaves.
The region‟s dependency on slavery ensured that Western North Carolinians would fight not
only to protect their homes, but also to protect the institution of slavery.48
While Revolutionary patriotism, fear of white enslavement and the protection of the
African slavery proved to be powerful incentives to fight, Christianity also played a pivotal role
in justifying the Confederate cause. Not only did Christianity motivate many to fight, but it was
also one of the biggest supplements to Confederate morale during the war. With a total free
population of 661,563, Western North Carolina held thirty percent of the free population in
North Carolina. According to the 1860 census, the total number of established churches in North
Carolina was 2,270, of which 722, approximately thirty-one percent, were within Western North
Carolina. From these numbers it is evident that religious participation in the region was
significant prior to the war (see tab. 2). Religious participation in Appalachia, was prominent and
on par with other regions of North Carolina. This religious activism would be existent during the
war, supplying Appalachian Confederates with the necessary will and courage to wage war.49
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Table 2: Number of Churches in Western North Carolina

As the conflict drove on, a belief that their cause was justified by the Divine Providence
enabled many Western North Carolina men and women to persevere during the war. McPherson
contends that the persistence of religion in the Confederate army was a major contributor in the
South‟s ability to withstand four years of fighting. He explains that religion, especially late in the
war, “helped to prevent the collapse of both armies during the terrible carnage of 1864, but it was
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a particularly potent force in the Confederacy.”50 The Appalachian soldier‟s faith in Christianity
allowed them to endure the physical torture of a soldier‟s life and the mental toll of war for over
four years. Their belief in a higher power and the promise of life after death helped subdue their
constant fear of dying, while also reinforcing the belief that God was on their side. The harsh
realities of soldiering in the Confederate army made loss of life a prevalent sight for all
Confederates. But a fervent belief in God often helped to subdue much of the stress and anxiety
associated with a soldiering in the army. In his study on religion and soldiers in the Civil War,
Steven Woodworth explains that the “horrors of war turned men‟s hearts toward God not only in
gratitude for His protection in battle or in facing hardships, but also because soldiers were
impressed with the peace and happiness of dying Christians among their fellow soldiers.”51
Trusting in God permitted many Confederates to rationalize the frequent occurrence of death on
the battlefield and in camp. Religion allowed for soldiers to place in perspective the loss of close
friends and comrades.
Not all historians have agreed that religion kept Confederate morale intact during the
conflict. In Why The South Lost the Civil War, the authors argue that religion played a key
component in the failure of the Confederacy. They conclude that if “will, or morale supplies one
of the intangible resources necessary to sustain a prolonged armed conflict, religion often proves
a vital resource in maintaining will and morale. Unfortunately for the South, religion not only
sustained morale, it also had the effect---eventually---of undermining it.” These authors argue
that religion turned against Southerners; instead of providing sustenance, the authors believe that
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religion brought about defeat through guilt. Battlefield losses and military setbacks convinced
Confederates that God was not on their side. However, evidence demonstrates that religion did
not shorten the life of the Confederacy, but actually prolonged it. In the bleakest hours of the
Confederacy, soldiers and civilians looked to Christianity for comfort and solace. Religion was a
fuel for Confederate armies that military defeats could not extinguish. Even as late as February
of 1865, many North Carolinians still believed God was on their side. The Daily Confederate
newspaper asked the question “Is there any hope for us? We can answer yes—the very same
hope that there was in the beginning of the war, not more, not less—hope in God.” The article
concluded that “He will not forsake us, until we forsake him.”52 This article underlines how
powerful the Christian influence was in maintaining Confederate morale. With each military
defeat, many Confederates reacted by praying even more, and most never questioned the belief
that God was on their side.
Western North Carolina Confederates frequently wrote letters home and to newspapers
articulating their belief in the religious righteousness of their cause. In his study of Confederates
in Lee‟s army of Northern Virginia, Tracy Powers contends that “Many correspondents and
diarists, whether or not they attended worship services and prayer meetings, frequently
mentioned their faith in God and His master plan for them.”53 Many Appalachian Confederates
were among the “correspondents and diarists” Powers speaks of. In letters home, they
encouraged their loved ones to pray for their country and themselves. One Western North
Carolinian wrote into the Spirit of the Age newspaper under the pen name “Nyanius.” He stated
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that “Our troops are in fine spirits, and I am not coloring facts when I say they are eager for the
arrival that seems to be in prospect. May God pardon our sins, nerve us for the contest, if it
comes, and if it be according to His will, give us victory.” 54 The author assumes that military
victory would be based on God‟s will. Private Phillip Shull from Watauga County conveys very
similar convictions when he wrote to his cousin while on furlough in Western North Carolina;
Private Shull explains that he “hop and trust in him who holds the destines of our land undar the
holler of his hand will bring this turbel afar to close and let us all gow home rejoyisen.”55 In a
springtime 1864 letter home, Captain Benjamin Justice told his wife: “I pray God to stand by our
noble army and sustain and strengthen and aid them in the terrible shock of battle.”56 Another
Appalachian Confederate, Lewis Warlick, made a similar appeal when he wrote home, “May
God defend and protect us from harm, danger through these troublesome times.”57 Interestingly,
both Warlick and Justice wrote these statements merely four weeks apart, which underlines how
many Appalachian Confederates were likely sharing these same sentiments regarding God and
the war.
For many Western North Carolinians, God was placed at the center of victories. Victories
were afforded through the skill of generals and strength of the troops, but in the end, many
Confederates believed that victories were above all else God‟s will. In an early 1863 letter, one
Western North Carolinian disclosed these sentiments when he stated that he felt “thankful to God
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for the many glorious victories that He has given us during the past year, I humbly invoke his
blessings on our army in the year 1863, and may it bring forth more glorious results than that
which is now reckoned in the calendar of the past.”58 These Confederates believed they were
fighting a war in the defense of their homes and families. Because, they imagined themselves not
as invaders, but as protectors of women, children, and their homes, they perceived God as being
on their side.
In The Confederate War, Gary Gallagher contends that throughout “1864 and into 1865,
many Confederates viewed their travails as orchestrated by a deity who eventually would reward
their efforts with success.”59 Western North Carolinians were firm believers that God was a
supporter of the Confederacy. Battlefield setbacks were not interpreted as being evidence of
God‟s wrath, but were instead seen as a message that sin among Southerners must be
extinguished before final victory could be achieved. A July 29, 1863, article in the North
Carolina Standard stated, “If we are sufficiently humbled under our chastisements, if we come
to God as a people, truly penitent for our sins, and ask His favor, we may confidently hope to
secure it.” The recent military setbacks were not interpreted by the writer as being cause to
believe that God may have not been on the Confederacy‟s side. Instead the writer comprehends
recent military losses as being associated with a failure in religious piety. The article interprets
Confederate success as being hinged on the piety of the Confederate population. 60 After the
military losses of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the Spirit of the Age wrote an article reflecting on
the recent military setbacks, “God had crowned our arms with such signal and marked triumphs
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that we grew vain-glorious and boastful, and gave to man the glory that belonged to Him. And
now he has rebuked and humbled our pride and arrogance, by suffering the enemy to visit
chastisement upon us.” As the article demonstrates, battlefield losses were believed to be the will
of God. However, one should not assume that Confederates saw military failures as the Lord
disapproving in their cause. The author concludes the article by expressing faith that God would
not abandon the Confederacy, and victories would soon return, “we believe in the justice of our
cause, so confidently, under the blessing of God, do we expect success […] let us put our trust in
God, with an humble reliance upon Him, constantly beseech that His arm of power and
protection may be stretched out over us and give us the victory, and all will work right.”61 This
article shows that even in the face of military losses, Confederates looked to God, and his
support in their cause was rarely doubted. Military defeats forced Confederates to create a reason
why their Creator would allow for battlefield losses. As the letters above indicate, many Western
North Carolinians found reasons to justify military defeat without doubting God‟s support for
their cause.62
As the war waged on and the Confederacy continued to suffer defeats, some Western
North Carolinians looked back to stories within the Bible which told of similar sacrifices. One
Western North Carolina newspaper looked to the Israelites for guidance, “Our late reverses in
arms have reminded us of that portion of Scripture found in chapter of Joshua.” The author
describes the biblical story of Joshua‟s victories over Jericho and subsequent defeat of the
Israelites at Ai. The author states that “they were defeated and fled.—The news comes to Joshua
and the elders of Israel […] what an example for us now to follow—not only for our President
61
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and rulers, but one and all, from the highest to the lowest.” The author admits that at the
beginning of the war, Confederates obeyed God and resisted sin, but they had since lost their
way, having “neglected both in a great degree—like Joshua in regard to Ai, we have not wholly
sought the Lord or made full and vigorous efforts […] we may find, as Joshua did that we need
not only to have full reliance in God, but use our every effort, one and all, united and all
together, ere we succeed.”63 Another article in mid-1864 also contemplated the history of the
Israelites, “The Israelites experienced great and sudden changes of national fortune and destiny,
which with their causes and connections, have been traced for our instruction” Telling the story
of the Israelites and Philistines, the author concludes that “The Philistines [were] the Yankees of
the old world, whom God raised up as scourges of national sins”64 The Spirit of the Age was
likely referring to the Bible when it told its readers, “History is full of examples, for our
encouragement, of more unequal and even more bloody wars, that finally resulted in the triumph
of the people fighting for their rights, their homes , and their lives. It is the will of God that we
suffer occasional disasters.”65 As it became clear to Southerners by 1862 that their independence
would not come without a heavy cost; many highlanders found the will to persevere in biblical
scripture and religious literature. Perhaps more importantly, these sources reveal that battlefield
losses and the increasing strains of war did not force Western North Carolinians to concede that
God was not on their side. During even the worst defeats and darkest hours most, Appalachian
soldiers believed they were among the army of the righteous defending their homes from an
invading enemy.
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Western North Carolinians reveled in the sanctity of their fight for independence, but
their faith in God went beyond simply seeing the Lord‟s righteousness in their cause. Religion
served as source of courage and inner strength for Western North Carolina men and women.
God‟s hand controlled their fate, it was his decision whether they lived or died. After the battle
of Seven Pines, one Ashe County Confederate wrote home to his mother affirming that “I am
well hoping that thes few lines may find you all injoying the same Blesing. We ort to be thankful
to god for thes many blessings. He has got us through.”66 As the letter reveals, this soldier placed
his trust in God and believed that it was God who safely brought him through the recent battle.
On April 17, 1864, Corporal James W. Wright wrote home to his wife in Wilkes County: “I
expect to try and discharge my duty as a soldier though it is painful to me. Yet I must obey my
commanders and above all I want to obey my Heavenly Commander I feel that he will do what is
right with me and if it is his will to take me from this troublesome world I hope I will get to a
better one.” The way Wright speaks of his military “commanders” and his heavenly
“commander” shows that Wright associates his military duty as part of his religious duty to
God.67 Although Wright wanted to be at home, he believed it was military duty as well as God‟s
duty that he remain in the army until the war was won. Wright, similar to other Western North
Carolinians, saw the Lord as a direct actor in his life. In another letter home Wright stated, “I feel
like the prayers my people in my behalf have been answered and I hope they will yet be
answered. Dear Fanny look to God for protection and he will not forsake you.”68 One Wilkes
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county soldier, Private Calvin Leach stated to his mother, “I hope that you will continue in
prayer for me that I may continue my duties as a Christian soldier while I am permitted to live in
this unfriendly world of sorrow.” Calvin continued, “if we meet no more on earth we may have a
happy meeting in heaven of bliss where parting will be no more.”69 It is significant how Leach
labels himself as a “Christian soldier,” which is revealing of the fact that Leach, like Justice saw
it as his Christian duty to remain in the army. One should not underestimate the importance of
these soldiers‟ references to their “Christian duty” because it underlines how significant a role
religion played in these soldiers lives.
For many soldiers, private Bibles served as a source of meditation and inspiration during
hours alone in camp or on picket. On the early morning of August 7, 1864, Captain Benjamin
Wright wrote his wife before beginning his day: “returned to my tent to write you a while and
then commence the duties of the day. My little Bible lies by my side, my friend, my counselor,
my guide. I am sitting alone in my tent.”70 For some local regiments, Bibles were supplied with
their uniforms. The Western Democrat noted that each private of the Waxhaw Jackson Guards
was given a personal Bible before departing: “on behalf of the ladies, a Bible to each one of the
Volunteers, impressing upon them in pathetic tones the great necessity […] to build our hopes of
sureness in this unhappy conflict of arms.” 71 However, not all troops were as fortunate as the
Waxhaw Guards; many soldiers went to war without Bibles. Throughout the war, private
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organizations, and citizens consistently tried to send soldiers Bibles and religious literature.72
Despite the efforts of many organizations, the Confederacy was never able to furnish enough
Bibles for their armies. Steven Woodworth explains that “the churches and Bible societies of the
South were never able to meet the wartime demand for Bibles.”73 On February 18, 1863, a
chaplain serving at a North Carolina hospital wrote into the North Carolina Standard requesting
religious literature for North Carolina troops. The newspaper states that Reverend Lacy was not
alone in his plea for literature and that “statements are coming to us daily, in increased numbers,
and especially since having more of our soldiers in N.C.” The article encouraged readers to
donate money for the purchase of literature stating, “we do hope many will speedily give […]
Let us determine, under God‟s blessing, to keep the bread of life before our noble, suffering
dying soldiers.” The article goes on to state that one of the first citizens to heed the Reverend‟s
call was a Western North Carolina woman.74 On both the home front and the battlefield, many
Appalachian Confederates looked to God for guidance and protection. The article skillfully
intertwines religion and patriotism together, demonstrating that God was often placed at the
forefront to the Confederate cause. This connection demonstrates that most Western North
Carolinians placed God and Country together, in other words, the fate of the Confederacy was
the will of God.
In his study on Virginia Confederates, Aaron Sheehan-Dean notes that the “language of
Christian sacrifice blended with that of national sacrifice. Volunteers mourned the loss of
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comrades, and families took pride in the men who died to defend their communities.”75 Like
Virginia Confederates, many Western North Carolina Confederates saw battlefield deaths as
sacrifices for a greater good. While the death of a soldier was mourned, a sense of Christian and
national pride comforted the loss. After the death of twenty-year old Lieutenant L.F. Haynes of
Yadkin County during the 1862 Peninsula campaign, an anonymous comrade from his company
wrote to the North Carolina Standard to announce his death. The writer stated that Haynes‟
“mortal part was surrendered as a sacrifice for the sins of a fallen world. When our country
called, he nobly stepped into its ranks to defend it from the attacks of our unnatural enemy.” The
soldier concluded that “Truly, our victories are robbed of their luster by the loss of such gallant
and brave officers as was our young friend, and it is only left to his country to have such
misfortunes filled by following in his heroic steps, and defending to the last, the righteous cause
for which he has offered his young life.”76 The author described Haynes‟ life as being
“surrendered” and “sacrificed” for the Confederate cause. In doing so, the letter implies that
Haynes‟ death was both a Christian and a national sacrifice. Most Western North Carolina
Confederates placed their lives in God‟s hands, meaning that all soldiers did their utmost to stay
alive, but the time of their death rested on God‟s will. This letter expresses those sentiments: it
was God‟s will that Haynes be “sacrificed” for his country.
When the Western Democrat received the news that Lieutenant Paul B. Grier died at
Bristoe Station, the writer stated that Lieutenant Grier was among “the noble lives that were
sacrificed on the altar of their noble country at Bristoe Station.” The article concludes that Grier
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“fell gallantly, a noble martyr to his country‟s cause.”77 The writer uses powerful language in
conveying the significance of Grier‟s death. Using the term “martyr” is quite significant because
it implies that Grier‟s death was a sacrifice for the cause of independence. After Captain D.
Harvey White fell at the battle of Spotsylvania Courthouse, his obituary appeared in the Western
Democrat. The obituary, which was likely composed by his comrades, stated that White‟s “blood
was poured out as a costly libation upon the altar of Liberty. And his name is now added to that
illustrious roll of immortal heroes, which shall ever be enshrined in the affections and crowned
with the benedictions of a grateful country.”78 White‟s comrades coped with their loss by
portraying his death as a sacrifice for the larger cause of independence. In this regard,
Confederate deaths were not seen as a result of war, but instead they were a sacrifice for
independence: dead Confederates were martyrs. The Greensboro Patriot exuded these
sentiments when it published the story of one Haywood County woman who lost her only
brother in the war. The paper explained that she “had but one brother to enter the army, and he
gloriously fell a sacrifice to his country‟s cause in the hard fought battle of Chancellorsville.”
These statements demonstrate that much of Dean‟s analysis on Virginia Confederates can be
applied to Western North Carolina Confederates. 79 Many Appalachian soldiers and their
families viewed a soldier‟s death as a sacrifice for a righteous cause, which provided a sense of
comfort and justification for the loss of their loved ones.
Beginning in the summer of 1863, religious revivals swept through much of the
Confederacy. In both the Army of Tennessee and the Army of Northern Virginia, soldiers came
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together in religious services and prayer.80 One North Carolina newspaper stated that “Extensive
revivals of Religion are in progress in several portions of the army on the Rappahannock and in
Tennessee […] May God extend the blessed work until our entire host of noble, patriotic soldiery
may become true and valiant soldiers of the Cross of Christ.”81 Religious services in camp were
a big part of many soldiers‟ lives. One, North Carolinian Confederate, Bartlett Malone, of the
Army of Northern Virginia wrote in the spring of 1863 that “General Jackson‟s preacher,
preached in our camps and his text was Hebrews chapter 3 and part of 7 and 8 virses the words
was this: To day if ye will hear is voice harden not your harts.” The next Sunday, Malone
attended two sermons, one of which was again performed by General Jackson‟s preacher, “I
went to meating at General Jackson Headquarters And the Preacher taken part of the 16th
chapter of Luke commencen at the 18 virse for the foundation of what remarks he made.” Later
Malone added that “in the eavning we had preachen in our Regiment from a preacher in the 18th
Virginia Regiment. And his text was in Proverbs 18th chapter and the later clause of the 24th virse
which reads thus: Ther is a friend that sticketh closter than a brother.” Malone‟s diary details the
numerous sermons that he heard nearly every Sunday that he was in the army. But his ability to
meticulously recall each chapter and verse of the sermon he listened to shows that Malone was
very knowledgeable of the Bible.82
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In an October, 1863 letter to the Spirit of the Age, one soldier from the 26th North
Carolina vocalized his regret and the feelings of many of his fellow soldiers over the fact that his
regiment did not have its own chaplain. The soldier tells the editor that “our men seemingly
manifest a great desire to hear preaching when an opportunity is afforded; and I think much and
lasting good might be accomplished if we had a faithful Chaplain.”83 North Carolinians in the
Twenty-Sixth Regiment were actively seeking religious prayer and guidance from chaplains. The
soldier continued to profess his faith in God when he stated, “Let us humble ourselves and return
unto the Lord and He will return unto us.” In this short line, it is very likely that this North
Carolinian was speaking of the military setbacks of the summer campaign. Asking for readers
and soldiers to return themselves to religious prayer and observation, the writer insinuates that a
return to God will bring back military success. The above letter demonstrates the urge to return
to salvation which can be attributed to the rise in revivals. However, it also brings to light the
pressing need for chaplains within the army. Throughout the armies, many regiments were often
desperate for chaplains who could sustain the perils of campaigning and battle. In many
circumstances the life of a regimental chaplain was no different from the life of the common
soldier. Steven Woodworth notes that “Chaplains might not be expected to live on quite the same
level as the private soldiers did, but they could still expect to sleep on the ground rolled in a
blanket, with canvas overhead or the stars. They might not have to march, but they would have to
spend whole days in the saddle. They would be exposed to all the camp diseases the soldiers
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faced and, sometimes, even to hostile fire.”84 Because of the rigors of the job, many chaplains
were hesitant to take on the position of regimental chaplains in the army.
Soldiers often did not listen or follow chaplains they did not respect. Woodworth explains
that some “men simply did not have the right personality, temperament, or other qualifications
necessary to gain the respect of the soldiers.”85 Chaplains who lived like soldiers were often
rewarded with the most devout followers. In a letter home to his cousin, Albert M. White stated
that “We have regular Preaching in Camp by the Rev Moretz I think well of him he is none of
your hifaluten fools he is just one of the Company he stays in a mess with QA Cline and Munroe
hoke he don‟t strut about and look down on others because they are not preachers I think he is
very well thought of in the Reg.”86 White‟s letter demonstrates how soldiers viewed themselves
in relation to their religious leaders. His letter reveals how many soldiers would have been
resistant to any chaplain who had not proven to the soldiers that they had the same courage and
grit of their followers. Benjamin Justice described one chaplain who had lost the respect of his
regiment: “I regret to have to tell you that your old friend Mr. Smith lost his usefulness and the
respect of the men in his regiment and his resignation has been the result.” Justice continued to
describe the many other chaplains in the North Carolina regiments. He stated to his wife that the
“chaplains of the 26th and 52nd Regt. have been at their post but a short time and have not yet
fully shown how they will wear, but my impression of them both is decidedly unfavorably.” This
statement by Justice demonstrates how soldiers closely watched their chaplains to see how they
stood up the rigors of camp life. The statements of White and Justice reveal how soldiers wanted
84
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Chaplains to practice what they the preached: the best and most revered chaplains were those
who understood the sufferings they preached about. 87
In a late 1864 letter home, one Western North Carolinian explained the frequency of
religious preaching in the army when he told his sister “This Sunday there is preaching in town
to day but I did not go there Is preaching evry night for the good of the soldiers.”88In a letter
home, Benjamin Justice conveyed similar sentiments when he stated, “At night the manly voices
of hundreds of those who survived Malvern Hill and Gettysburg and Bristoe Station may be
heard from the rude pole Chapel, singing the songs of Lion and praising God their preserver.”
For many men, religious observation went well beyond the individual solitude associated with
prayer. For these soldiers, religious observation took more active forms, such as singing and
more vocal forms of prayer. Justice concludes in his letter home that a “considerable religious
interest prevails among the several regiments of the Brigade.” Justice‟s letter takes on a sense of
brigade pride when he tells his wife that “The Chapel mentioned just now was built by the joint
labor of the different regiments and is regarded as the common property of all.”89 Justice was a
captain in the 26th North Carolina Regiment and a part of MacRea‟s Bridgade which consisted of
many Western North Carolina men from Ashe, Wilkes, Iredell, and Caldwell Counties.
However, MacRea‟s Tar Heels were not the only North Carolina Brigade to build a formidable
church of their own.90
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In March of 1864, J. Henry Smith, pastor from Greensboro told of his visit to Cooke‟s
North Carolina Brigade, where he had witnessed the building of their brigade chapel. Smith led
the first religious services at the new chapel: “I dedicated it to the service of God, and
administered the Lord‟s supper in it on the first Sabbath that followed. At least two hundred
partook of the communion. It is the largest chapel in the Army of Northern Virginia […] this
chapel is filled day and night with attentive and serious Learners.91 The building of brigade
chapels demonstrates how fervent religious energy existed throughout much of the North
Carolina regiments and the Confederate Army. The depictions made by Benjamin Justice and
Henry Smith reveal that during both day and night many soldiers found solace and inspiration
inside the chapel walls. Religious meetings provided a much needed reprieve from the boredom
in between battles, while also helping ease the heartache and anxiety created by being away from
home.
Western North Carolinians‟ frequent references to God reveal how they viewed their war
for independence, demonstrating that they saw their cause as one of righteousness. Like the
thousands of soldiers who believed their cause was supported by God, many citizens followed
suit. In an early war letter, Cornelia McGimsey wrote to a friend serving in the Confederate
army, “we have right and justice on our side; and that the God of Battles will protect us.” Later
in the year, she asked, “May God incline his ear to our humble petitions and may He save our
country from destructive war and prepare us all for a land of eternal felicity.”92 Cornelia like, so
many on the home front, frequently prayed for God‟s intervention in the Confederate cause.
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After a Confederate victory at Second Manassas, another Appalachian citizen, Cornelia Henry
wrote, “They had another fight near Manassas. The Confederates whipped them back. Oh God
grant us peace once again is the pray of many a heart.” Similar to the many soldiers on the
battlefield, Cornelia Henry also frequently read her bible. She noted in her journal, “I have read
the book of Leviticus in the bible today and some of Numbers. I am reading my bible through for
the third time in my life. I am reading Josephus‟ complete work of the bible.” Her Bible likely
offered the same solace and comfort to her as it did to the thousands of soldiers on the
battlefield.93
In their study on Western North Carolina, John Inscoe and Gordon McKinney argue that
while religion prevailed in the armies, religious participation declined dramatically on the home
front. They conclude that the closure of churches in the region and the loss of chaplains to the
army resulted in a decline in religious participation. The authors explain that “Much of the
degeneracy was due to the breakdown of local institutional sources of support.” Because of this,
they believe that “Religious organizations played a diminished role in the mountain life during
the war, despite a spiritual revival that swept through the Confederacy.”94 The frequent
appearance of religious articles published in newspapers throughout the state demonstrates how
Christianity still remained strong during the war. Despite the decline in organized church
services in Western North Carolina, many citizens still remained faithful to God. Letters from
soldiers in the army often requested that those on the home front pray for each other‟s safety as
well as independence and final peace. It is likely that many citizens observed these requests from
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soldiers. Just as men on the battle front prayed for honorable peace, so did citizens on the home
front. Cornelia Henry wrote in her personal journal, “Oh! How I pity the poor soldiers this cold
day. They are suffering for clothes and shoes at this time […] I do indeed pity them, may we
soon have an honorable peace is my prayer and the pray of every true Southerner.”95 In a letter
to her husband, Emma Clayton asked “why oh why are we not humbled before God, for then and
not till then can we expect the blessings of peace upon our country.”96 Emma‟s letter sounds
similar, to that of many of the Western North Carolina Confederates who composed similar
religious expressions in letters home. Like many Appalachian soldiers, Clayton believed that
God had a direct hand in deciding the fate of their cause.
While the prominence of organized religion may have been hindered by the lack of
preachers on the home front, evidence suggests that Inscoe and McKinney may have
overestimated the lack of organized religion in Western North Carolina. Just as men told their
loved ones at home of their religious experiences, women also told their husbands, siblings and
friends of their own religious experiences. Cornelia McGimsey wrote to a local friend in the
army describing a local sermon, “I have just returned from preaching, we heard a splendid
sermon today.”97 In an October, 1864, letter, Emma Clayton similarly told of a sermon she
listened to: “I went to church to day and heard an excellent sermon indeed from an Englishman,
Mr. Lomax, I have never listened to minister who had a better flow of language.”98 Both these
women appear to have actively participated in religious sermons in the mountains, which is
reflective of the existence of religious enthusiasm on the home front.
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In a study on Confederate nationalism in Harrison County Texas, historian Andrew F.
Lang found that this county experienced strong spiritual resilience on the home front. Similar to
Western North Carolina, Lang notes that in Harrison County, “Local Spiritual leaders
emphasized that the South was chosen divinely from God which created a sense of salvation and
appeal on the home front that was difficult to resist.”99 Like the citizens in Harrison County,
many Appalachian citizens took solace in the words of the local pastors. One Western North
Carolina woman, Mary Patterson, documented her frequent visits to church in a diary. On April
9, 1863, Patterson noted her whole family‟s participation in a day of fasting, “Today having been
appointed by our President as a day of fasting and prayer we all went to church and heard a good
sermon by Mr. Bahnson.”100 An examination of Mary Patterson‟s diary reveals that she and her
family regularly attended church services. Like many soldiers, these women expressed interest
over religious gatherings in their communities. Additionally, these women also described their
experiences with their preachers. They alluded to their church visits as if they were a regular or
common activity in their lives. Lastly, none of these women expresses any regret over a lack of
religious services available to them in their communities. While one cannot deny that religious
participation may have struggled to maintain its prewar levels during the Civil War, Emma
Clayton, Cornelia McGimsey, and Mary Patterson reveal that organized religion did remain
active in the Western North Carolina mountains throughout the war.
For most Western North Carolinians, their allegiance to the Confederacy began the day
that Abraham Lincoln ordered 75,000 volunteers to subdue the Confederate States. Believing
that they were being invaded, many Western North Carolinians found recognition for their cause
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by looking back to their Revolutionary ancestors. Although Revolutionary patriotism proved to
be a vital part of their identity, without Christianity, the Confederate will to win would not have
lasted until 1865. However, as the next chapter will demonstrate, some Western North Carolina
men were not completely loyal to the Confederacy. When Appalachian Confederates had their
loyalties to their new nation tested by war, some were not willing to endure these hardships. As a
result, desertions would increase as the war went on, creating new struggles in the region.
Desertion into Confederate Appalachia resulted in violence that created a divide between loyal
Confederates and their new nation.
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CHAPTER TWO: COMPETING LOYALTIES, WESTERN NORTH
CAROLINIAN DESERTION
Western North Carolinians were quick to answer North Carolina‟s call for troops.
Throughout the war, they would flock from their homes and into the army. While most Western
North Carolina troops served and remained present for duty until the end of the war, a significant
minority of Appalachian men deserted from the army. The reason men chose to desert was not
always the same. Throughout the war, many Western North Carolina Confederates would desert
simply because they lacked the will to fight. While some Confederates deserted because they no
longer wanted to fight for the Confederacy, others deserted for more complicated reasons
involving their family and homes. Initially volunteering to protect their families; Appalachian
men had to decide between serving the Confederacy and protecting their families at home. While
most stayed with their armies, others were not willing to risk their families‟ well being for
Confederate independence. This chapter will demonstrate that a significant portion of Western
North Carolina desertion stemmed from the Confederacy‟s inability to sustain a safe and stable
home front while its soldiers were off at war. Initially going to war because they believed
fighting for the Confederacy was the best way to protect their families, many Western North
Carolinians would desert once they saw that the Confederacy had failed to protect their families
in their absence.
Throughout the war, desertion was a recurring thought for many soldiers as they
struggled with the conflict of how to protect their families while they were away. However,
civilians on the home front were also confronted with similar struggles. Although civilians did
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not struggle with whether or not to desert themselves, they still had their own conflicts with
desertion. Understanding that men were needed in the army, many Appalachian civilians labored
to ensure a sustainable life at home without the help of the men in the army. Civilians on the
home front battled to protect their homes from deserters and Unionist violence, while also trying
to ensure that they had enough manpower to make a proper sustenance. This chapter will show
that throughout the war, men and women on the home front, similar to soldiers, tried to find a
balance between supporting their families while also supporting the Confederacy.
The first portion of this chapter details the history of how Western North Carolina
became riddled with deserters and subsequent violence early in the war. Although not all
violence in Appalachia would be caused by deserters, they often partook in attacks on the
civilian populace. The second part of this chapter will examine the home front in relation to the
soldiers‟ understanding of their duty to the Confederate nation and their families. As conditions
in Appalachia collapsed and decayed into violence, soldiers had to justify either deserting or
remaining with the army. The third portion of this chapter looks at civilians in Western North
Carolina and examines how women and men tried to cope with the loss of able-bodied men.
Unable to make up for lost manpower, citizens on the home from constantly faced famine and
violence.
By bringing to light the complexities of desertion, this chapter will demonstrate that the
lines between loyal and disloyal are not always clear, but are often blurred. Many Appalachian
deserters, especially those who hid out the in mountains using violence on civilians to survive,
can easily be labeled as disloyal or anti-Confederate. However, there is another portion of
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deserters who had the will to fight, but deserted because they were needed at home. If the
Confederacy had protected Western North Carolina communities, these soldiers would likely not
have deserted. Additionally, in many of these instances, these soldiers would return to the army
once their families‟ well being and safety were secured. Both groups were deserters, but they
actually possessed different levels of loyalty.
Throughout the war, deserters who refused to fight for the Confederacy would hide out in
the Western North Carolina Mountains. As the war quickly intensified and soldiers realized that
the war would not be a short one, many Appalachian men began to desert back home. In
November of 1862, Cornelia Henry wrote in her journal about a local resident who had deserted.
She stated that “Pinck Allen is lying in the woods as he is a deserter. It would be much better for
him to go to his regiment. He belongs to the 25th Reg. He was no use when he was at home and
now he is no use to his country.” In the coming months, deserters began to convene in Cornelia‟s
community and resorted to stealing food for survival. In the summer of 1863, she noted in her
journal that several deserters where “in the neighborhood. They ought to be sent to the army if
possible and soon as they are stealing of the honest people.” As Cornelia‟s entries reveal,
deserters exacerbated the suffering on the home front, putting greater strain on the already
struggling citizens. 101
In his study of Western North Carolina during the Civil War, William Trotter states that
“desertions in significant numbers really started when the mass of volunteers realized it was not
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going to be a short, victorious war.”102 Trotter‟s statement identifies why a significant portion of
Western North Carolinians deserted. For many, it simply boiled down to the fact that they
lacked the will or inspiration to fight in a prolonged conflict for the Confederacy. Shortly after
the war began, deserters would begin gravitating to the confines of the Western North Carolina
mountains. However, it is false to assume that all deserters in the region were Western North
Carolinians. The Appalachian Mountains had a strong appeal to deserters throughout the
Confederacy because of the numerous places to hide, elude, and if need be fight off Confederate
authorities. Historian Richard Reid concludes that “a large number of deserters fortified
themselves in the western mountains, but upon close inspection it appears that many of the men
who took refuge there were from out of the state or from other parts of North Carolina.”103
Geographical advantages that the region offered to deserters guaranteed that Appalachia would
be plagued with a large population of deserters throughout the war.
In a letter from a Buncombe County soldier to his brother published in the Spirit of the
Age, the soldier addressed the deserter problem in Buncombe. When he heard that his brother at
home was getting ready to join the army, he sarcastically requested that his brother also “take all
the deserters who are lying out shirking their duty” with him, “for they are numerous”104 Western
North Carolina would soon become overwhelmed with deserters who took advantage of the
mountainous region for hiding out. Confederate efforts to catch deserters in the region rarely
relieved the problem in the mountains. Often inefficient and untrained militia led the efforts to
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catch deserters. Historian Mark A. Weitz explains that “North Carolina used its state troops to try
to control the deserter problem, actions that led to violence in the mountains of western North
Carolina.” These efforts to reel in deserters were rarely effective. Deserters reacted by forming
guerilla bands to protect themselves from militia and home guard forces. Weitz notes that by
“1863 deserter bands arose in the region and added their numbers to the mix. Deserters had only
one concern, survival, and in an environment already rife with violence they had no problem
plundering homes or fighting with either army, so they posed a serious danger to both soldiers
and civilians.”105 Although deserters in Appalachia did not account for all the violence, which
can also be blamed on Unionists and the Union Army, deserter attacks in the region compounded
an already volatile situation in the mountains. Confederate efforts to protect the civilian
population in Western North Carolina were often reactionary and fractured, most military
operations were ineffective in rooting out deserter bands. Troops often only arrived after attacks
had occurred; therefore the bandits had already plundered the community and escaped.
Throughout the war, the Confederate efforts to secure and protect Appalachians were usually not
successful. Military forces struggled to successfully engage the enemy, which was largely due to
the enemy‟s ability to quickly escape into hiding after attacks.
The greatest incident of deserter-related violence occurred in January 1863 in Madison
County. On January 8, 1863, a band of approximately fifty deserters, many of whom were
believed to have been from the neighboring town of Laurel, invaded the small town of Marshal
in search of salt and provisions. While ransacking the town, the gang shot one Confederate
soldier on furlough and destroyed numerous buildings. After taking the supplies they needed, the
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band of raiders attacked the home of Colonel Lawrence Allen, a prominent citizen and soldier.
The deserters forced the colonel‟s three children outside, taking their blankets and exposing them
to the cold weather. After the attack, Confederate authorities ordered Colonel Keith and the
Sixty-Fourth North Carolina to respond to the attack on Marshal. While in route to Madison
County, Keith received word that one of Allen‟s children had already died after the exposure to
the cold, and another one of his children was near death. Enraged by the death of the child,
Keith‟s regiment quickly rounded up fifteen suspected deserters who were believed to have been
involved in the attack on Marshal. After two of the fifteen suspects escaped while the regiment
was in route to Knoxville for trial, Keith, out of frustration over the escapes, chose to execute the
remaining thirteen prisoners. The prisoners ranged from the ages of twelve to fifty-six, and seven
of them were related; sharing the same last name, Shelton. In the weeks following the massacre
A.S. Merrimon, a state solicitor for the western district of North Carolina wrote Zebulon Vance
and notified him that he “learned that probably 8 of the 13 killed were not in the company that
robbed Marshal and other places. I suppose they were shot on suspicion.” When Confederate
authorities received news that Keith disobeyed orders and executed the prisoners, he and four
officers on his staff were all forced to resign from the army. Governor Vance was outraged by
the murders, and tried to have criminal charges brought against Keith, but his efforts were to no
avail. 106
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The events in Madison County, known as the “Shelton Laurel Massacre,” placed
Confederate authorities in Appalachia in a negative light. The difficulty of finding the elusive
raiders tormented military authorities in the regions, creating a frustration that led to the death of
thirteen men. In the days following in the wake of the Shelton Laurel Massacre one newspaper
stated, it “is therefore to be hoped that the military authorities here, or the Government at
Richmond will take some effective steps to ferret out these tory bandits of the mountains, and
give security to loyal citizens.” The paper concluded “Let them be caught and hanged
summarily, and sufficient force kept in the mountains to preserve the lives and property of loyal
citizens.”107 The John Inscoe concludes that Shelton Laurel “represented the most extreme
manifestation of escalating tensions between lower-ranking troops and civilians, as guerilla
warfare blurred the lines between combatants and noncombatants and obscured the rules of war
that defined both.”108 But even more so, the event brought to light the inherit inefficiency of the
Confederate efforts to protect the Appalachians. Shelton Laurel served as a prime example of
how military forces failed to prevent violence and depredations in the mountains. In his study on
Appalachia and the Shelton Laurel Massacre, Phillip Paludan explained that Unionists, and
deserters “in the surrounding mountains were hardly affected by the Shelton Laurel killings.”
The attempts to terrorize the deserters “did not paralyze guerillas; it gave them power. It
sanctified their marauding by hoisting over it the banner of betrayed and brutalized innocence. It
ennobled the guerilla‟s cause.”Arriving well after the invasion of Marshal, the military excursion
to catch the perpetrators did little to ease the sufferings of mountain populations because the
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damage to the community had already been done. But even more so, the attempts of Colonel
Keith to deliver justice only emboldened the bandits, doing nothing to in deter future attacks. 109
By the middle of 1863, local authorities were soon overwhelmed by deserters who
resorted to violence as a means to survive. Weitz contends that by “June of 1863 sizable deserter
armies existed in Yadkin, Wilkes, and Caldwell counties.” In particular, Weitz found that
“Wilkes County became home to a band of five hundred deserters that created a paramilitary
unit, fortified their camp, and openly challenged the Confederate army to come and take them. A
band of one hundred deserters roamed Cherokee County, disarming Confederate soldiers en
route to their units.” Deserter bands would often roam, crossing county lines and attacking
neighboring towns. Cornelia Henry wrote in June of 1864, “the tories and deserters killed Andy
Johnson of Henderson Co. a few weeks ago. I hope they will never come here. I do hope and
pray we may never fall in the hand of our enemies.” In the last years of the war, Appalachia
would be filled with deserter gangs which preyed on unprotected civilians.110
In the spring of 1863 Captain G.W. Hays of Cherokee County wrote to Governor Vance
requesting military assistance to help deal with the growing deserter problem in Western North
Carolina. On June 6, Governor Vance responded to the captain‟s request for troops. Vance
explained to Hays that he could not send any more troops. He stated, in “answer to your
representations of the great danger to the property and peace of the mountain country, arising
from the disaffection on the border of Tennessee and the great number of deserters who are
resorting thither […] I hope the good citizens will accede to for their own defense.” Vance
109

Paludan , Victims: A True Story of the Civil War, 101.
Weitz, More Damning than Slaughter, 190; Cornelia Henry to her journal, June 21, 1864, in Fear in North
Carolina, 226.
110

63

continued that although he wished to supply troops, he told Hays “In no other way shall I be able
to furnish protection to the good and loyal citizens of that country, as I have no other regular
troops to spare for that purpose.”111 Vance‟s proposition that the Appalachian citizens arm
themselves and protect their communities was not effective in curtailing the rising violence in the
region. By the middle of the war, Weitz explains that “Desertion into North Carolina‟s
mountains had evolved to the point that makeshift groups of civilians were unable to suppress
deserters.”112 Vance‟s response to Hays‟ request for assistance reveals how the Confederacy was
unable to properly defend and protect Appalachian civilians. Without assistance from Richmond,
the aid Vance could supply to Hays was not nearly sufficient to quell the violence. As a result,
soldiers in the army would look on as Western North Carolina stood largely defenseless against
violence at the hands of deserters, Unionists and the Federal Army.
Many who deserted were being forced to choose between the worst of two evils. While
the majority of Western North Carolinians wanted to serve the Confederacy, they did not wish to
serve if it meant the starvation or suffering of their families. Therefore, when they were pressed
with the decision to stay in the army, or leave to protect their starving families at home, some
soldiers chose the option of leaving without permission. Soldiers who deserted for familial
reasons were problematic in the sense that they cannot be labeled strictly as loyal or disloyal.
Since these men did not desert because they lacked the will to fight, one cannot necessarily label
them as totally disloyal. Lying somewhere between these two poles, these soldiers demonstrate
that desertion is not black and white. Historian David Brown explains that there were those
“whose loyalty fluctuated, who equivocated, and who did what was best for themselves and their
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families.”113 While all deserters may have acted disloyally, many soldiers, like the ones Brown
describes, were more loyal than others. Gary Gallagher explains that not all Confederate
desertion is indicative of “weak will or unhappiness with the Confederacy.” Similarly, in her
study on North Carolina in the Civil War, Chandra Manning notes that as “the war‟s fury
enveloped the South, it exposed the tensions between the needs of families and the needs of the
Confederacy that rested at the heart of Confederate patriotism. The sheer length of the conflict
kept men away from the homes and communities that relied on their labor and in that way
endangered rather than furthered white families‟ best interest.” For most soldiers, their family lay
at the heart of what they were fighting for. Therefore as their families‟ sufferings escalated, a
conflict emerged between the Confederacy‟s needs and their families‟ needs. Manning concludes
that most “southerners responded to such conflicts with resentment that did not negate their
commitment to the Confederacy but did strain their willingness to continue making the sacrifices
Confederate independence would require.”114 As the Confederacy continued to fail to provide for
families and protect those on the home front, Western North Carolinians would begin to question
if the Confederacy had their best interests in mind.
At the beginning of the war, desertion of North Carolina troops was not as widespread as
it would become in the last years of the war. Although the initial years of the war saw a
gravitation of deserters into Appalachia, much of the desertion did not occur until late into the
conflict. Richard Reid contends that many deserters were actually battled hardened veterans.
From a case study done on 4,395 North Carolina soldiers, Reid found that “almost 70 percent of
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all deserters had fought in the war for over a year, and more than 56 percent had served for over
18 months.” Until the spring of 1863, relatively few desertions occurred in North Carolina
regiments. Between June of 1863 and early 1865, nearly seventy percent of all desertions would
occur. The extended period of time spent in the army by most deserters adds weight to the
argument that not all deserters were equally disloyal. Deserters who soldiered for one or two
years before deserting most likely had a stronger loyalty to the Confederacy than someone who
deserted only after a few weeks or months in the army. Reid concludes that a “man who deserted
in 1862 cut himself off from much of his society and weakened the South‟s chance of victory.
His decision was, if not a rejection of that society‟s norms, at least a blow to its military
efficiency. The same act in April, 1865, can hardly be seen as a sign of dissent.” The rise in
desertion ran parallel with the increasing violence and military excursions in North Carolina.
With decreasing food supply and the increase of violence on their families, many Western North
Carolinians questioned their loyalty to the Confederacy. However, this was only done after years
of service to their nation.115
Western North Carolinians understood their commitment to the Confederacy to be a type
of mutual contract or agreement. They were willing to enlist and fight for the Confederacy, but in
their absence, they expected the Confederacy to protect their families. As the war went on, it
became clear to many that their families were not getting the protection or support that was
promised to them. In a January, 1865, letter to Governor Zebulon Vance, a group of North
Carolina soldiers expressed these concerns. In this letter, which was signed “North Carolinians
of Lee‟s Army,” the soldiers stated that “Very many of our wives were dependent on our labor
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for support before the war, and when articles of food and clothing could be obtained easier than
now. At this time they are alone, without a protector, and cannot by hard and honest labor, obtain
enough money to purchase the necessities of life.” This statement demonstrates how a soldier
may be driven to desert because his family was in danger of starvation. Additionally, the use of
the word “protector” reveals that these soldiers felt that their families were without proper
defense. The date that this letter was written reveals that even as late as January, 1865, soldiers
were still willing to continue the war as long as they could be rest assured that their families were
protected at home. The soldiers explained to Vance that “It is not in the power of Yankee armies
to cause us to wish ourselves at home. We can face them, and can hear their shot and shell
without being moved, but sir we cannot hear the cries of our little ones and stand. We must say
something, must make an effort to relieve them.” The courage of these soldiers still remained
intact even after four years of fighting, but as the letter demonstrates, their loyalties to their
families had been forcing them to question whether to desert. The soldiers conclude their letter
by directly addressing the North Carolinian desertion issue: “Do something for them and there
will be less desertion and men will go into battle with heartier good will. But it is impossible for
us to bear up under our many troubles, the greatest of which is the suffering of our wives and
little ones at home.” These Appalachian Confederates show that desertion among many North
Carolinians was not always a reflection of war weariness. They contend that it was not within the
power of the Union armies to make them desert; their desertion had little to do with loyalty. This
letter shows that it was in the Confederacy‟s grasp to curb much of the desertion problem if it
would secure the home front.116
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The North Carolina Confederates in the above letter were willing to stay in the army
despite their families‟ sufferings; however, many other soldiers did not do so. Unlike the soldiers
who appealed to Governor Vance for help; some Western North Carolinians would not choose to
be so diplomatic. The need to get back home to aid their families was too urgent and could not be
postponed. After receiving word that his youngest child had died and his wife was near death,
one Western North Carolinian deserted the army in order to come to her. The soldier explained
to Vance that “my family got sick an I hear of the Death of my last child an my wife was
unexpected an I left the service an came home an with the help of almighty god I went home and
found my wife a live and I wish you to pardon my transgression buy grantin of me a furlo of
thirty days an a passport to return to my command.”117 This soldier‟s story reveals the
complexity behind many Western North Carolina men‟s choice to desert. Deserting not because
he did not want to fight, he instead fled the army because he wanted to aid his dying wife.
Although he could be portrayed as disloyal, the soldier was not disloyal in the sense that he no
longer wanted to fight for the Confederacy. This soldier‟s willingness to return to the army, as
exhibited by his request for a furlough rather than an exemption, reveals that he did still have a
level of loyalty to the Confederacy. In his study on Virginia Confederates, Aaron Sheehan-Dean
found that for some Virginia deserters the line between loyal and disloyal was similarly skewed.
He explains that throughout the war “the line between loyal and disloyal continued to be fuzzy;
not all men who were absent were necessarily permanent deserters.”118 Just as Virginians often
left the army and returned, many North Carolinians did the same. In her study on desertion
during the Civil War, Ella Lonn estimated that of the 24,000 North Carolina soldiers who
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deserted, approximately 9,000 would rejoin to the army after deserting. The large minority of
deserters who returned to the army demonstrates how not all deserters were completely
disloyal.119
Western North Carolina soldier Malcolm Rae was one of the 9,000 North Carolina
deserters who returned to the army. After receiving word that his family desperately needed him
at home, Rae left the army and fled home. In a letter to Governor Vance, Rae explained that he
“volunteered in defense of his country in June 61 to serve twelve months after that time elapsed I
was pressed in for the war with the promise of a furlough.” The soldier explained that after his
furlough was never granted he decided to head for home without permission. He stated that, “so
promise being violated I took the privilege to go home to see my almost helpless family.”
Similar to the soldier cited above, the urgency Malcolm felt to return to his “helpless family”
surpassed his willingness to stay in the army. But after being home for fifteen days he decided to
leave his family and attempted to return to the army, only to be caught and taken to prison for
desertion. Malcolm concluded his letter by requesting to be released from jail and allowed back
to his regiment, “being respectfully willing to return to my regiment I would therefore […] have
me released from prison and sent to my regiment, 25th NC.”120 Unable to withstand being away
from home, some soldiers deserted just long enough to aid their struggling families. In his study
on North Carolina desertion, Richard Bardolph contends that “thousands of absentees went home
fully intending to return to duty after looking to the spring plowing and planting.”121 Another
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private, Thornton Sexton acted similarly to Malcolm. After campaigning through many of the
major battles, including Second Manassas, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville, Sexton left
without leave on May 19, 1863. Shortly before leaving Sexton told his parents, “Dear Mother I
would like to be at hom if I cood. Well I never new what bad times was before in my life.” But
despite deserting, Sexton returned on September 1, 1863. Although Sexton never stated his
reasons for returning, it is apparent that he served loyally until he died of wounds incurred at the
Battle of the Wilderness. 122
Another Western North Carolinian, Private R.H. Larseen, told Vance that he deserted
after his family pleaded for him to return home. He stated, “My wife sent for me. My oldes child
an my wife was sick […] I ask my officers to let me come home an they would not let me and I
came home anyway.” The soldier continued that he was ready to come back to the army, “I will
go back an stay if you will send me a pass to go back.”123 In his study on Virginia Confederates,
historian William Blair explains that many North Carolinian deserters were simply the victims of
a geographical disadvantage. He concludes that “Virginians blamed the most frequent desertions
on North Carolinians,” however, he contends that “Virginians may have looked more patriotic
only because they enjoyed the advantage of geography—with home nearby they could easily
„straggle‟ while those leaving for homes farther away earned the label of deserter.”124 Blair
brings to light the inherent problem with desertion. Virginians are often seen as the most loyal of
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all Confederates, but like North Carolinians, many were prone to return home when needed.
Fortunately for those who wished to only return home for a short time, their close proximity to
home allowed them to avoid the “deserter” name. Blair‟s study shows that for many Virginia
Confederates who deserted home and returned to the army, their family played a key role in the
will to fight. For Virginians, like many North Carolinians, their families were an integral
motivator in decisions to desert.
Western North Carolinian deserters returned to the army for a variety of reasons. While
many may have been persuaded to return purely out of loyalty, the fear of being caught and
punished for desertion were also motivating factors.125 Although these soldiers were not as loyal
as those who never deserted, or even those who deserted with the intent to return, they did still
maintain a level of loyalty. This was the situation for Private Robert Chapman. Shortly after
Chapman deserted, he wrote to Zebulon Vance stating, “I left the 9th day of November without
absence for which I have repented for a thousand time I am a true southern man and always has
bin.” Chapman concluded that he “was truly sorry for and doo sincerely beg for pardon and […]
I want some way to get transportation back to my regiment without being punished.”126
Chapman, like many other Western North Carolina deserters wished to return to the army after
being at home for a period of time.
Desertion was a problem that plagued both soldiers and civilians throughout the war.
Although soldiers may have struggled with whether to desert, civilians similarly struggled with
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how to survive without sufficient manpower at home. For some women, the problems that they
incurred in the absence of their fathers, husbands, and sons were too great to handle. Throughout
the war, a faction of Appalachian civilians wrote to their loved ones, encouraging them to desert.
Just weeks after the fall Vicksburg and the loss at Gettysburg, one Appalachian woman from
Madison County wrote her husband in the army, “I want you to come home as soon as you can
after you git this letter […] I want you to come home worst that I ever did.” For this Western
North Carolinian woman, her Confederate loyalty was not strong enough to weather the war. The
recent military defeats proved to be reason enough for her to encourage her husband to desert.127
However, not all women were willing to plead for their male relatives to desert.
Throughout the war, many women petitioned the North Carolina Government to have a male
relative detached. In most cases, Appalachian civilians attempted to get male members of the
community detailed back home so that they could assist in bringing crops. They also recognized
that if men were not sent back home to help the communities, some soldiers would take it upon
themselves to come home without leave. When one Forsyth county women requested that
Governor Vance have her son detailed, she stated, “please grant me this my petition that I may
have my son John Hominger detailed belonging to the 4th battalion Co. B Junior Reserves. I wish
to get him detailed this year on my farm my husband is in the army in the NC Calvary both my
son and my husband was in the army all last summer I made but little grain.” The willingness of
both her husband and son to enlist reveals how dedicated their family was to the Confederate
cause. Additionally, one must imagine how difficult it was for this woman to survive in the
absence of her two male providers. The request to have her younger son sent home was a
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compromise between supporting herself and doing her part for the war effort. She did not
request her husband to be released from the army, thus demonstrating that she still supported the
Confederate cause. 128 Another North Carolina woman who had four sons in the Confederate
army wrote to Vance requesting that her hospitalized son be allowed home. Elizabeth Clemmons
affirmed “I have furnished four of my children to go in this war and they have been in service for
two years” With one son dead, two serving and one in the hospital, Mrs. Clemmons asked
Governor Vance to allow her ill son to come home. Despite her already courageous sacrifice of
four sons, she promised that her son would reenlist if possible: “And if he Ever Gits able to go in
service Again he is wiling to go and I am wiling to do all I can for my Country and the peeple
around me knows that.” This letter underlines how many families tried to compromise between
supporting the military and also ensuring their families‟ survival. By requesting that only her
sick son come home, Ms. Clemmons attempted to support both the Confederacy and her family.
Mrs. Clemmons concludes her letter by promising Vance that her son will reenlist if he recovers
from his wounds; this reveals her dedication to the Confederate cause. 129
In some cases, mountain women collectively came together to ask for assistance from
Governor Vance. In a September 8, 1864, letter, citizens in Catawba County requested that the
Senior Reserves from that county be allowed home in order to help bring crops in preparation for
the upcoming winter: “it is time that the wheat crop should be sowed and immediately
succeeding this will be the making of our molasses and the gathering of our corn.” As their letter
reveals, these citizens were desperate for help to farm their fields. But despite the urgency of the
needs, these Western North Carolina citizens recognized that the Senior Reserves were off
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fighting for their independence and the protection of North Carolina. Therefore, in an effort to
reach a compromise with the Confederate government, they asked that “if the public necessity is
such that these men cannot be disbanded we pray you to use your influence to have them detailed
for 60 days.”130 This statement reinforces how many mountain citizens made efforts to reach a
balance between the war effort and their own well being. They recognized that their men were
needed on the front lines and could not return home permanently. Additionally, this letter gives a
unique glimpse into how many mountain communities ran dry of able bodied men. Since most
their younger men had enlisted, these citizens likely assumed that getting any military age man
released was not likely. Therefore, they were bargaining for the temporary release of older men
who had been conscripted into the senior reserves. Citizens of Haywood and Chatham Counties
described a similar situation of desolation, when they asked Vance for help bringing in their
crops. They explained that “We the undersigned Citizens petition to know if there is any chance
to git our hands early next week to harvest. Our early wheat and oats are getting ripe and we will
have to aid the Soldiers wives in saving there grain,” Similar to the petition made by the
residents of Catawba County, this letter exhibits how able bodied men had been completely
depleted from mountain communities. Throughout Western North Carolina the lack of
manpower had become so severe that many counties faced famine and starvation. 131
Another concerned Appalachian civilian wrote to Vance requesting a detail of one
hundred experienced soldiers to defend the region, “one hundred men could do what is necessary
to be done immediately in this county. That a force is necessary between here and the Tenn-line I
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do not doubt but it should be men who have seen service.” This civilian points out an important
fact that most of the soldiers in charge of protecting Western North Carolina were untrained and
ill prepared to combat deserters and Unionist. Although he was not speaking directly on the
issue of desertion, the letter still addresses one of its main causes. His letter brought to the light
the fact that the Confederate government was not protecting its civilians. He continued to state
that without military protection, their crops would be threatened, “This valley is much exposed to
raids from that quarter. As subsistence is scare in East Tenn. It is not improbable that the federals
will try to occupy this valley through the winter.”132 Without the protection from deserters and
Unionists, crops throughout the region were destroyed. This letter confirms that violence on the
home front and starvation went hand in hand. The writer illustrates how much of Western North
Carolina was left unprotected. Throughout the war, loyal citizens would plead for help and
manpower from Confederate authorities, but their pleas frequently went unanswered.
On many occasions, citizens would write to Vance and warn him that if government
assistance were not provided, then Western North Carolina soldiers would likely desert the army.
Civilians recognized that much of the desertion was due to the Confederacy‟s lack of support on
the home front. One Western North Carolina woman told Vance, “There are but very few at
home the men are dreaned out of our country very clean. There is not a detailed man in this
community to work for us nor defend us no ways at all.” Mrs. Comly explained to Vance that her
husband had died in the service and with the conscription of her Grandfather in the Senior
Reserves she no longer had anybody at home to provide protection for her. She continued that
her vulnerable status was common among the region and that if “our noble soldiers hear how
132
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their families are exposed it will almost cause them to desert the camp an come hom.”133 This
concerned citizen‟s dire warning to Vance should not be viewed as a sign of dissent. In her study
on the Civil War home front, Jacqueline Glass Campbell notes that, “From the other side of the
line came letters from Confederate civilians who warned authorities about the dangers of
desertion.” Campbell continues to state that one “cannot assume that the civilians and soldiers
who alerted Confederate authorities about the potential of increased desertions were disloyal.
The truly disaffected would surely not have drawn attention to themselves. This was especially
true of Confederate women, for whom desertion posed a multitude of problems.” Campbell
points out an important fact that most citizens who wrote to Vance warning of the desertion issue
or pleaded for assistance were loyal citizens. These citizens recognized that without help,
soldiers would likely leave the armies.134
Western North Carolina was not only vulnerable to deserters and Unionists, but also to
speculators. In some communities, food and clothing speculators made it even harder for some
mountain families to survive. Shortly after the war began, speculators in Western North Carolina
raised the price of food above the wages that soldiers and relief funds could supply to their
families. In his study on Appalachian women, Gordon McKinney found that speculation “in food
had driven the prices so high that county officials did not have the resources to provide for every
needy family. The result was that many women discovered that the community that had
supported them economically and had provided security for them could no longer do either.”135
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Phillip Paludan similarly found that by the middle of the war the “cotton, clothing, wool, corn,
and hogs—all vital to the lives of mountaineers—were almost impossible to get.” Paludan
concluded that “Speculators hung onto their supplies,” refusing to sell to families without enough
money.136
One Western North Carolina women wrote to Vance stating, “I cant get what the county
allows me tell the 13th of July and when I get that it wont be only $22.50 and it would take it all
to by one Barrel of corn if I had the money now and if you don‟t provide me with some means to
get support I am bound to suffer my husband is in the army and has bin for a long time.”137
Another North Carolinian who was in charge of providing for soldiers‟ families in his
community expressed the same frustrations and despair felt by many Western North Carolina
families. In his letter to Vance, Mr. Armstrong described the devastation being caused by
speculators in his neighborhood, “these women are getting in a very destitute condition for
clothing […] speculators are about to ruin our county.” He continued that if prices could be
lowered to a reasonable price, the women may be able to purchase cotton; “few have but little
farms they have not team horses are scarce and they cannot get plowing done, if cotton yarn
could be had most of them could I expect at a fair price pay for enough to cloth themselves and
their children.”138 Just as Confederate authorities were unable to protect Appalachian civilians
from deserter bands, Mr. Armstrong‟s letter reveals that the Confederacy was equally ineffective
in protecting Western North Carolina from speculators.
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The Confederacy and the North Carolina government recognized that without assistance,
desertion would no doubt continue to increase. Additionally, disloyalty and disaffection among
the populace on the home front would spread. To combat this, state and local officials labored to
provide assistance to impoverished families throughout the conflict. At the beginning of the war,
some counties in Western North Carolina had developed relief funds which were created to
purchase food for families who could not support themselves. However, according to historian
John Inscoe, the “demand for aid quickly grew beyond the capacity of counties alone.”
Beginning in December of 1862, the North Carolina government had begun distributing money
to local county governments for disbursement among disadvantaged families. Each county had
devised lists of indigent families who needed aid to survive, and relief would be handed out
based on who needed it most. In the last two years of the war, North Carolina, “appropriated $1
million in February 1863, $1 million in December 1863, $1 million in May 1864, and $3 million
in the last months of the war in 1865.” The efforts of officials in Raleigh and county officials
played a significant role in assisting families, but it was never enough to alleviate the suffering of
those on the home front.139
On some occasions relief was available, but was denied to needy families. One Western
North Carolinian who had her only son die in service wrote Governor Vance for assistance after
she was denied war relief by local officials. Mary Johnson explained to Vance, “I am a poor
woman, having only one son and one daughter […] I applied twice to the committee for the relief
of indigent families of soldiers and they refused to assist me on the grounds that my son did not
support me before he went to serve, which is not strictly true, for he assisted me much.” As Mary
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Johnson‟s letter demonstrates, many families who needed food and assistance could often be
denied aid for controversial reasons. Throughout the war, North Carolina women on the home
front went hungry as available provisions were denied to them. Many women, like Mary Johnson
“complained to Vance that county justices were hoarding or not distributing money, food, and
supplies fairly.” This lack of government foresight exacerbated the deteriorating conditions in
the mountains.140
Other Appalachian families encountered similar problems. While James Wright was off
fighting; he became disgruntled when he received word that his family was not receiving aid. In
an April 10, 1864 letter, Wright wrote to his wife, “I want you to write to me whether you have
drawed anything or not from the commissioners […] if you have not got anything I want to know
the reason. I think you are as much entitled to it as any of them. Write as soon as you get this and
let me hear from you and how you are getting along.”141 Wright‟s letter appears to suggest that
he was aware that his family was not receiving the food that they desperately needed. One should
also note the sense of anxiety that can be seen in his letter home because he had no way of
knowing if his family was starving. Although Wright never deserted the army, the anxiety that he
expresses in his letter home is the same anxiety that pushed many Western North Carolina
soldiers to desert. Unfortunately for the thousands of families living in Western North Carolina,
the risk of famine only increased as the war went on. In June, 1864, one newspaper wrote that
“If half we hear of suffering and distress in the Western counties to be true, the condition of
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many of the people is pitiable indeed. There is much suffering for want to food.”142 With the
letters and reports detailing the famine and devastation occurring in their home region, it is easy
to imagine how some soldiers would answer their families‟ call for assistance by deserting.
Throughout the war, many newspapers across the state would write of the depredations faced by
those in the mountains.
Approximately 107,000 (ninety-four percent) of North Carolinians between the ages of
20-49 fought for the Confederacy and never deserted the army.143 Most Western North
Carolinians recognized their value to the army and despite their urge to leave, they never did.
One Appalachian Confederate, Eli Fogleman, expressed the sentiments of most Western North
Carolinian soldiers when he stated to his father, “I want to come as bad as you want me to come
but it is impossible to get a furlough on a detail if I could come home I would do so. I cannot
come home with out I runaway and I will not do that.”144 Fogleman‟s letter is symbolic of the
plight that over 100,000 North Carolinians went through during their service away from home.
His letter demonstrates that soldiers often struggled with a need to support their family and a
need to support the Confederacy. Although Foglemen neglects to describe why he would not
leave without a furlough, one can imagine that one reason he was driven to stay was because he
believed fighting for the Confederacy was the best way to protect his family.
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Many Western North Carolina soldiers who refused to desert were outraged when their
comrades left the army without leave. In a letter to his wife, Benjamin Justice complained, “I am
extremely mortified at the conduct of these cowards and base wretches who would sell their
country or throw away their liberty and their manhood.”145 Although Justice likely wanted to
return home and see his family, his loyalty to the Confederacy outweighed his willingness to
desert. Therefore, when other soldiers deserted back home, Justice viewed their actions as
disloyal and cowardly. Another Western North Carolinian, Private Julius Gash, was more bitter
in his sentiments when he proclaimed “I wish I could express the contempt I naturally cherish for
the deserter, and men who will at this particular time desert. I do candidly think they ought to be
shot. I think it is nothing more than what they justly merits. Why! Confound a man who is void
enough of principle to desert his country in so perilous a time as now.”146 As these letters reveal,
desertion was perceived by many soldiers as an act which threatened the independence of the
Confederacy. Soldiers recognized that every man who deserted made their army weaker and
threatened the survival of the Confederate nation.
Similar to the soldiers above, many civilians on the home front also despised deserters.
When Margret Westbrooks found out that two of her four brothers serving in the Confederate
army deserted, she was horrified by the shame they brought upon themselves and the disservice
they did to their country. Margret wrote to Vance requesting a pardon for her two brothers, “I
have two Brothers who have bin influenced to disgrace themselves by deserting their comrades
and post of duty […] they say they are willing to go back and perform their duty if you will
145
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pardon them and send them the nesary papers to prevent their being punished on their return to
their command.” Ms. Westbrooks explained that she was willing to endure the adversities of the
home front alone, but only if the Governor would allow her brothers to return the army without
penalty. She explained, “I have two other brothers in Confederate service and am all alone in my
humble home to work for my daily support. Yet I am only willing to labor in this way if you will
only pardon my brothers and alow them to return to there comrades and post whose they are
willing to serve their country.” Ms. Westbrooks was not willing to allow her brothers to desert
even though she likely could have benefited from their help. Margaret Westbrooks‟ story reveals
how families were often divided in their willingness to support the Confederacy. Although she
was an ardent supporter of the Confederacy, two of her brothers appear to have been unwilling to
make the same sacrifices that she was. Her letter shows how many Western North Carolinians
had varying levels of loyalty. Many families were divided between members who were willing to
support the Confederacy versus those who were less inclined to do so. 147
Given the circumstances faced by so many Western North Carolina citizens on the home
front, it is understandable why husbands and sons may have deserted. However, as this chapter
has demonstrated, desertion was not always a choice made because of war weariness. While
many Western North Carolinians deserted because they no longer wanted to fight, many others
left because their families needed them. According to Mark Weitz, only 2,457, ten percent of the
24,000 North Carolinians who deserted, went to the Union Army.148 This number is significant
because it shows that very few North Carolina soldiers chose desert from the Confederacy and
embrace the Union. Desertion was almost always a “back to home” choice. While many
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deserters may have been anti-Confederates, most deserters were not necessarily pro-Union. In
many circumstances, deserters hiding out in the Appalachian Mountains were equally antiConfederate and anti-Union. Although many Western North Carolinians may have left the army
without leave, few did so because they were Unionists. Whether they left for familial reasons, or
simply because they were disenchanted with the Confederacy, only a slim minority would make
the decision to become Unionists.
Throughout this chapter, it was been shown that the Confederacy‟s inability to assist
those families on the home front forced many Appalachian Confederates to desert. With the
increase in desertion and disloyalty, many areas within Western North Carolina began to
experience significant levels of dissent. In the last years of the war, Appalachian solidarity began
to decay as disaffection with the Confederacy increased. While unionism and disloyalty in most
counties remained repressed and less vocal, border counties experienced a much higher level of
dissent. The events surrounding the Shelton Laurel massacre in Madison County reveal how in
many cases mountain areas experienced heightened levels of violence. Border counties, such as
Madison were placed in volatile situation. With a higher population of deserters and a closer
proximity to East Tennessee, many loyal Confederates faced harsh retributions during the course
of the war. Yet despite the prevalence of Unionists in border counties, John Inscoe notes that the
“proximity to the far more prevalent Unionism across the state line did not necessarily make
loyalists out of Carolina residents.” Although dissent and disloyalty may have been heightened in
border counties, most citizens in these counties still remained loyal to the Confederacy, but their
loyalties did have a price. In return for their support for the Confederate cause, highlanders in
these counties expected protection and assistance from the Confederacy. As the food supplies
83

decreased, and depredations increased, many soldiers realized that the Confederacy was not
fulfilling its promise to them and they therefore deserted.149
Appalachian Confederates looked at the prosecution of the war as a shared responsibility,
while they were off fighting, the government would aid and protect their families at home. Many,
however, felt that the Confederacy failed to carry its share of the burden. A close examination of
why soldiers deserted is often revealing of an inherent conflict which existed within the
Appalachian Confederate identity. In1861, the Confederacy won the allegiance of Western
North Carolinians because they were convinced that fighting for the Confederacy was the best
way to protect their homes and families. For these men, their home and family was an essential
part of their identity. As the war intensified and soldiers saw that their families faced violence
and starvation, many soldiers lost their reason to fight. This brings to light the fact that it was not
always the power of the Union army that made Appalachian soldiers desert. Much of the
desertion problem existed within the Confederacy because of its inability to protect families on
the home front. The Confederacy was unsuccessful in filling the void left by the absence of
enlisted men in Appalachia. When Western North Carolina Confederates saw that their homes
and families were not being cared for by the Confederacy, they deserted.
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CHAPTER THREE: WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA OPPOSITION TO
CONSCRIPTION
Two months before Jefferson Davis‟s first call for conscripts, the Greensboro Patriot
asked the question “Will there be a draft?” This Western North Carolina newspaper asked that
North Carolinians avoid being conscripted by volunteering, “we hope her brave sons will not
suffer themselves to be drafted, to maintain and defend every thing dear to them; but that they
will rally to the standard of their country‟s defense, with a determination to conquer the vandal
enemy whose foot now pollutes the soil of our State.”150 By early 1862, southerners had
abandoned hope of a short war and began to come to terms with the fact that their fight for
independence would be paid at a much higher cost in lives than perceived. After receiving word
that men would be conscripted, the Patriot did not denounce the new law, but instead requested
that all able bodied men not “suffer” the embarrassment of being conscripted. Like the editor of
the Patriot, many Western North Carolinians understood the necessity of keeping the armies
supplied with troops. For many, conscription was viewed as a policy to ensure that the able
bodied men, who had avoided volunteering, would be required to serve.
Throughout the war, the Confederate Government, in an attempt to keep men in the army,
continuously increased their age quota for conscripts. The first conscription act was instituted on
April 16, 1862, requiring for all men between eighteen and thirty-five to serve. However, the
increasing demand for manpower forced Richmond to raise the age quota to forty-five in
September of 1862. When the conscription act changed its maximum age of enlistment, the Spirit
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of the Age responded in favor of the act, stating “It will be seen by reference to another column,
that President Davis has called for all between the ages of 18 and 45—under the conscription act.
Let not only this call be promptly responded to, but let every man over 45 who is capable of
bearing arms, rise up to the necessities of the occasion. If we do this, we can successfully
contend against them, as we have done before.” 151 Seven days after breaking the news of
Davis‟s new conscription act, the Spirit told its readers, “This call is rendered proper and indeed
indispensable, by Lincoln‟s call for 300,000 conscripts to swell his forces to be employed for our
subjugation. His armies, whatever force they amount to must be met, if it should require every
man and boy in the Confederacy.” 152 The Spirit of the Age was quick to come out in support of
the revised Confederate Conscription Acts. Recognizing the Confederacy‟s desperate need for
men, the paper proudly stated its willingness to put forth “every man and boy.” Like the Spirit of
the Age and the Patriot, many North Carolinians were willing to supply as many men as the state
could furnish. In Western North Carolina, many citizens saw the conscription acts as a way to get
the shirkers into the army. In a study on one Appalachian woman, Mary Bell, John Inscoe notes
that after the first conscription act was authorized in April of 1862, Mrs., Bell, “took some
satisfaction in the face that a Confederate conscription act had passed.” Mrs. Bell‟s only
apprehension with the new law was that it only took men up to thirty-five, “there are many men
here at 45 just as able and who have just as much right to go as men at 35.” Many in Western
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North Carolina would share the same sentiments as Mary Bell; conscription was a way to get
unwanted men at home into the army.153
Initially, the majority of North Carolina newspapers were not opposed to national
conscription, however, one newspaper, the North Carolina Standard, was a staunch opponent
from its very beginning. In an April 23, 1862 column, William Holden, the paper‟s editor,
proclaimed, “This act breaks the faith of both the State and Confederate governments […] we
regard it as inexpedient, unnecessary, oppressive, and unconstitutional. It places the rights of the
States and the liberties of the people at the feet of the president.” William Holden and his
supporters opposed the government‟s forced enlistment of civilians, arguing that all enlistments
should be “upon a volunteer principle entirely.”154 Holden was a one-time Vance supporter
during his first term and fellow Conservative party member, but had become a strong opponent
of Vance and the Richmond government by the middle of the war. Throughout the war, the
Standard advocated for raising a volunteer army and opposed conscription policies on the basis
of constitutional rights. In his work on North Carolina politics, Marc Kruman explains that
Holden and some Conservative Party members saw conscription policies as a movement toward
a centralized government. Conscription “represented the first step toward military despotism. If
the central government and the military alone decided when and how many troops were needed
and then took sole responsibility for recruiting them, it would be but a small step for the military
to attain complete ascendancy in the South.”155 Kruman notes that Holden‟s opposition to Vance

153

John Inscoe, “Coping in Confederate Appalachia: Portrait of a Mountain Woman and Her Community,” North
Carolina Historical Review 69 (October 1992), 396.
154
William Holden, “Editorial.” North Carolina Standard (Raleigh) April, 23, 1862; “Troops for our Defense.”
North Carolina Standard (Raleigh), December, 10, 1862.
155
Kruman, Parties and Politics in North Carolina, 1836-1865, 245.

87

emerged from the central government‟s incursion into the state policies. In early 1864, Holden
stated that his paper would “insist on strict construction of the Confederate Constitution, and on a
searching but no ungenerous scrutiny of the acts of our rulers. It will inflexibly oppose any and
every attempt to render civil authority subordinate to the military power.”156 Throughout the war,
Holden‟s newspaper denounced conscription for its neglect of civil authority. Over time
Holden‟s anti-conscription sentiment would gather the support of many, if not most, North
Carolinians.
Like many citizens, North Carolina state officials did not immediately push back against
Confederate conscription. But as complaints over conscription began to pile on his desk, Vance
began to take a more critical view of the acts. Although North Carolina officials enforced the
Conscription Acts during the war, the state government often battled with the Confederacy over
conscription. During the war, Governor Vance never publically denounced the Confederacy‟s
forced enlistment of North Carolinians. However, behind closed doors he frequently expressed
his dissatisfaction with Richmond‟s right to enlist the state‟s citizens. Historian Joe A. Mobley
explains that Vance “did complain frequently to the Davis government about what he considered
the injustice and illegality of the War Department‟s actions in enforcing the conscription laws.”
Much of Vance‟s anger with conscription emerged after the Confederate government attempted
to conscript public officials. In a March, 1863, letter to Jefferson Davis, Vance argued that with
the “magistrates, the Militia, and the municipal officers of our incorporated towns, constables
and such like officers of the state swept into a camp of instruction, I am at a loss to know what
would be left of the power or sovereignty of this State […] So obvious is the great damage and
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disparagement which this latitudinous construction of the law could work against the States, that
I cannot believe its framers so intended it.” Vance ended his letter requesting that Davis‟s sense
“of justice will not fail to perceive the weighty reasons of comity, policy, and respect for States
rights—the great democratic doctrine of our revolution.” Governor Vance understood that the
Confederacy‟s over-implementation of conscription had begun to threaten North Carolina‟s
ability to function. 157
Beginning in the middle of 1863, the North Carolina Supreme Court became involved in
the state‟s battle over conscription. When hearing court cases over conscription, North Carolina
Supreme Court Chief Justice Richmond Pearson consistently ruled against Confederate
authorities, siding with the defendant. In her study on conscription in North Carolina, Memory F.
Mitchell explained that the “application of the conscription and exemption laws to individual
situations resulted in constant disagreement between military authorities and civil courts […]
Chief Justice Richmond M. Pearson, of the Supreme Court, stood as a symbol of freedom to
many soldiers who appealed to him for discharge.” Supporting the rulings of the courts,
Governor Vance made every effort to ensure that military authorities did not overstep civil
authority in North Carolina.158
One of the most notable conflicts between the North Carolina courts and the Confederate
government arose over the substitution clause of the Conscription Acts. When John Irvin, a
North Carolina citizen, was called up for conscription, he avoided service by providing a
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substitute who was thirty-six years of age. However, when the Confederate government
increased the conscription age to forty-five, they claimed that Irvin‟s substitute was of the age to
be conscripted himself and Irvin therefore needed to enlist or provide a second substitute. After
Irvin did not provide another substitute, he was arrested by Confederate authorities. Throughout
the state, citizens who had provided substitutes who were now of conscription age were being
required to provide a second substitute. When the case of John Irvin reached the State Supreme
Court, Pearson ruled that the conscription of citizens who had already provided substitutes was
unlawful. Gordon B. McKinney notes that “Pearson concluded that Irvin still had a valid
substitute in service, and he consequently discharged Irvin from Confederate authority. A
number of other men who found themselves in the same position as Irwin applied for a writ from
Pearson, and they were also freed from Confederate custody.”159 When the Confederate
government demanded that Vance overrule Pearson‟s rulings, Vance upheld the decision of the
chief justice. Richmond authorities removed the substitute clause from the conscription act
shortly thereafter. However this did not end the conflict, but actually made it worse. In February
of 1864, Judge Pearson reacted back against the Confederate government when he ruled that the
Confederacy‟s suspension of Habeas Corpus did not apply to conscription cases. When
Confederate authorities attempted to ignore his decision, Governor Vance demanded that the
ruling of Pearson be upheld or the state militia would be deployed to make sure the decision was
being enforced. Pearson‟s ruling would be voted down by the remaining court justices later that
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spring, but Vance‟s persistence that state rulings would not be ignored by Confederate authorities
is revealing of the inevitable conflict between state and Confederate authorities. 160
Like Vance and the courts, most Appalachian citizens by 1863 believed that the
conscription acts had started to do more harm than good. In his study on North Carolina
conscription, Walter C. Hilderman argues that North Carolinians, like thousands of “Southerners
were bound to regard national conscription as a serious encroachment on state‟s rights.”
Hilderman continues that a “large portion of the Southern population, consistent with the
principles of state‟s rights, was opposed to any national government, much less mandatory
military service in defense of one.” His work pins down why some North Carolinians, including
Holden, may have opposed conscription, but he does not uncover why many others may have
disapproved of the acts. Hilderman‟s explanation for the North Carolinian opposition to
conscription neglects to account for the evidence showing that many North Carolinians were
initially supportive or impartial to the act. This chapter will make it apparent that Western North
Carolinian resistance to conscription was not always framed in a debate over states‟ rights.
Instead, many Appalachian civilians opposed conscription only after it attempted to take men
from the community who could not be replaced. Initially many citizens looked favorably upon
conscription because it forced men into the army who were avoiding service. Eventually Western
North Carolinian communities would be bled dry of manpower. When the conscription act‟s age
quota was extended to forty-five, Cornelia Henry remarked that “the conscript bill has passed
one house of congress. If it should pass both houses it will nearly ruin this country as there are so
many poor men with large families of that age.” As conscription officers returned to take the last
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of the male farmers and skilled laborers, Appalachian civilians would fight to keep these men at
home. 161
When the conscription acts began to remove the last remaining men at home, citizens
were forced to argue and fight for their exemption. Much of the Western North Carolinian
disaffection with conscription emerged when the Confederacy was failing to protect and feed
families in the absence of their men. When Second Conscription Act was passed, Cornelia Henry
feared that her thirty-nine year old husband would soon be conscripted, “The conscript bill has
passed. I hope Mr. Henry will not have to go. If he does, what is to become of me and my
children?”162 As more and more men were volunteering and being conscripted, the Confederate
government was not, in return accounting for the protection of the families. In his study on
conscription in Louisiana, John Sacher explains that disaffection with conscription in that state
often emerged for this same reason, “many Louisianans felt that the Confederate government had
abdicated its responsibility for their protection, and consequently they resisted conscription into
the Confederate army.”163 In the beginning, Western North Carolinians were willing to allow for
conscription, but as their available labor dwindled, the Confederacy failed to step in and provide
aid for communities. It was only after the Confederacy neglected to hold up its end of the bargain
that most civilians turned against conscription. In his study of Virginia Confederates, William
Blair notes that Virginians “generally accepted conscription and other intrusions of government
in their lives. Continued tolerance depended on how political leaders administered the new
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systems and met the challenges that lay ahead. As the year progressed, shortages of food and
other goods eroded faith in the government.”164 Just like many Confederate Virginians, Western
North Carolinians were willing to accept Confederate conscription until the policy began to
seriously threaten the survival of those at home. Opposition to conscription only grew in the
Appalachians after the white males who provided the food and products necessary for sustenance
of their communities were conscripted. Western North Carolinians were willing to send all
excess men into the army, but as valuable men in the communities were taken, resistance grew
among the populace.
The resistance to conscription by those on the home front can be largely attributed to the
Confederacy‟s failure to supply the mountains while the men were gone. As the Confederacy‟s
inability to feed and secure the home front worsened throughout the war, Appalachian citizens
faced increasing starvation and violence. Presented with an already limited number of males, the
Conscription acts attempted to remove the few remaining able-bodied men in mountain
communities. Gordon McKinney explains that “the absence of the adult males meant that there
was no one left in the family to break the sod during the spring planting and to haul heavy rocks
and timbers in newly cleared […] As the war progressed and difficulties multiplied, agricultural
production fell sharply.” Despite the best efforts of women on the home front, the void created
by the absence of the male labor source was too great to be supplemented solely by female
labor.165
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Focusing on the need to supply men to the army, the Confederacy was often slow to heed
civilian calls for the government to exempt or release conscripted men. Even when Governor
Vance spoke out against the conscription of farmers, the Confederacy neglected to listen to his
pleas. John Inscoe explains, “Vance‟s attempt at the most obvious solution—to put an end to
conscription so that enough men could be retained in the area to feed the population—fell on
deaf ears in the Richmond government”166 But as the pressure to keep farmers at home increased
from Western North Carolinians, the Conscription Bureau did begin to release some farmers
from service. In April 1864, the Asheville News responded to the exemption of some farmers by
stating:
We are glad to learn that the government is awaking to a sense of danger likely to follow
the conscribing of farmers at this time.—We learn that sixty-one farmers have recently
been released from Camp Holmes and sent home to cultivate their farms […] Anyone at
all acquainted with the real condition of the State at this time and the great suffering that
many now experience, knows that not another man should be taken from the corn field.
Take non producers but let the farmers stay at home.167
This article reveals that the Asheville News was not completely opposed to the Conscription
Acts, but it was against the government‟s conscription of badly needed farmers. The newspaper
encouraged the government to “take non producers” but asked to leave the few remaining
farmers at home. The newspaper recognized that those who could be spared should be
conscripted, but it was opposed to conscripting farmers and men of skilled crafts because of their
necessity on the home front.
Local communities fought against the conscription of farmers and other skilled
craftsman because it only deepened the food shortage crisis, making life unsustainable. One
166
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Confederate colonel operating in the region sympathized with those living in the mountains.
Colonel Jon L. Black of the First South Carolina Calvary, wrote that the “want of the necessary
labor to cultivate the soil is so great in this mountain region that I am decidedly of opinion that
all the men liable to conscription for State defense who are engaged in cultivating the soil should
be left at home.” Black continued that “I recommend this because I am fully convinced that the
distressed state of this country for the means of subsistence has been and will be the cause of
many desertions from the army.” Despite the recommendations for suspension of conscription by
Colonel Black, Richmond would continue to conscript men from Appalachia. Throughout the
region, citizens would appeal to Vance for exemptions.168
In late 1864, a forty-nine year old Burke County farmer who was one of the last farmers
remaining in his community wrote Vance requesting an exemption from duty. Convinced he
would soon be conscripted, the farmer stated, “at the age of a bout 49 I think as right as I can tel
and as sure as I have to go this neighborhood of soldiers family‟s will be bound to suffer as I am
all the man in this section that can assist them any and if I leave there will be no wheat sowed
and neither will the corn be gathered.” This letter to Vance exposes how sparse much of the
manpower in many communities had become. Serving as one of the last able men in his
community, the loss of this farmer would have surely done much more harm than good to the
community. In other words, this farmer was more valuable to the Confederate cause by hoisting
a plow than a rifle. Many of the men removed by conscription were vital to the community; the
benefit that came from their placement in the army was often outweighed by the detriment of
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their loss at home. Although this farmer was petitioning Vance for his exemption on the ground
that he was needed at home, he concluded his letter by stating “I don‟t know if you can do
anything in my behalf or not […] But if there is no other chance I will go willingly.” It is
significant how this farmer was still willing at the age of 49 to join the ranks and do the duty
required of him in the army. As this letter demonstrates, many Western North Carolina men who
resisted conscription were still patriotic. Many of those who resisted conscription did so because
they knew that they could better serve the Confederacy with a plow rather than with a rifle. This
letter shows that this farmer was petitioning for his exemption, but what is more revealing is that
he was doing it for reasons other than those publicized by Holden and his supporters. He was
fighting for an exemption because he knew that many at home depended on him for their own
survival; his opposition to conscription had little to do with the act‟s infringement on his rights as
a free citizen. 169
In June 1863, a group of citizens pleaded for the exemption of Wiatt Woody because “his
wife is not a healthy woman and has four little children and his father and mother.” They
continued that his parents were in “their old age and his father being almost helpless.” By all
circumstances, Mr. Woody was unable to leave his home for the army. These petitioners assured
Vance that “We do not send this by no means to avoid the Conscript law […] we your petitioners
do certify that the said Wiatt Woody is and has been a loyal citizen of our county.”170 This
farmer‟s circumstance was an unfortunate one, but as this letter shows that his resistance to
conscription was not based on disloyalty or an unwillingness to fight. Many of those who signed
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Woody‟s petition likely already had fathers and sons in the army. Therefore, if Woody‟s
situation was not truly destitute, and he was not sincerely needed at home, one could imagine
that many of those who signed his petition would not have done so. In another letter from
fourteen citizens in Buncombe County, these residents requested the exemption of Alsey Cordell
on the grounds that he had “a large family of his own” and “two other families in part dependent
on him for support.” These residents also insisted that Alsey was a loyal citizen, but his help was
needed at home and not in the army. Petitions for exemptions from the army were from loyal
citizens who already had loved ones serving. Families who already had relatives serving would
not have willingly signed petitions to keep men at home who were not truly needed. Although
citizens in mountain communities would have wanted to see every available man to enlist, they
considered certain men as unavailable for conscription because their labor was too vital to the
community.171
In another letter to Governor Vance, more than fifty women pleaded with Vance to not
conscript any more men from North Carolina. The women explained to Vance that they had
already sacrificed their strongest men, “Many of our natural protectors have been called away to
the field of strife—many have fallen. Their deeds of prowess not forgotten in History.” However,
these women explained that with the enlistment of so many men, “Few remain at home—We
humbly petition that they may not be taken from us.” Similar to the letter above, the women
describe a destitute situation where women could not find food within their counties. If these
citizens were to lose more men, the condition of their country would have become even more
perilous: “Our fields must be idle if men are not left to sow the crops, and gather those now
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standing. It is impossible that women can attend to there household duties provide clothing and
perform the labors of the field […] Many widows and orphans made such by this war, already
feel the pangs of poverty and before the approaching winter has passed must endure the bitterest
destitution.”172 These women desperately needed men to perform farming duties so that they
could have food to survive. Because the Confederacy could not supply communities with enough
sustenance to survive, women had to rely on the few remaining men at home to feed the whole
community. In his study on Harrison County, Andrew F. Lang found a similar disaffection
among women and conscription. Like Appalachian women, Texas women in Lang‟s study “were
typically distressed in part by the effects of conscription and the subsequent responsibility to
manage the slave population, as well as the larger duty to cope with loneliness and assume many
of the burdens normally undertaken by men.”173 Most Appalachian women were not stressed
with the burden of guarding large slave populations due the regions relatively small number of
slaves, but they were still faced with the challenge of taking on absent men‟s roles. However,
workloads often proved too arduous, and without a male component, farm labor could not be
completed. John Inscoe contends, “While women and adolescents could and did plow the fields
that had been used in previous years, the absence of fathers, husbands, and older sons meant that
many other fields lay fallow.” When the Confederacy threatened to take the last of the farmers,
these women were forced to speak out against any further conscription in their community. 174
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Farmers were not the only ones who were desperately needed at home; each community
also needed tradesmen, such as blacksmiths, millers, and cobblers. Despite the ability of some
households to produce enough food to survive, “the specialized skills of the tanner, wheelwright,
miller, and blacksmith were essential to every family, regardless of how self-sufficient or
isolated they might be.” Therefore, when these men of specialized skills were pulled from their
towns, their loss had a disastrous effect on the whole community. Prior to the war, many
communities relied on a select few tradesmen to fulfill the needs of their community or town.
After the waves of volunteering, many communities lost their only skilled manufacturers. By the
middle of the war, Western North Carolinians found themselves without their local blacksmiths,
millers, or cobblers. Men of skilled trades were pressed with a workload that spanned many
miles and sometimes many communities. Oftentimes resistance to the conscription of tradesmen
would take part on a community-wide scale. When conscription officers attempted to take the
last of these men, many in the community would join together in producing petitions and asking
for exemptions on the grounds that these men were of too much value to the community to be
conscripted. 175
When a blacksmith from Chatham County was called up by conscription officers,
numerous citizens from the county wrote to Governor Vance pleading for his exemption from the
army. The citizens of Chatham explained to Vance, “we the undersigned Petitioners would
respectfully suggest to your Excellency that we believe that the said R.W. Dixon would be of
more service to the Confederacy to remain at home as a black smith then he could in any other
way.” Without a blacksmith these concerned citizens recognized that they would no longer be
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able to procure and repair farming tools; they explained, “For if he is taken away to remain a
way. The farming interest we arsure you is bound to suffer.” The citizens of Chatham assured
Vance that the forty-one year old Mr. Dixon, “is in every respect a good loyal citizen and all his
relations that should be in the Army is there.”176 By late 1864 Dixon was one of the last ablebodied men in his community. These Chatham residents stated that all of Dixon‟s relatives who
could be spared were already in the army. This letter provides a picture of the desperate situation
faced by so many mountain communities in the last two years of the war.
In his study on Virginia Confederates, William Blair explains that the “need for labor was
the leading reason for writing to the Confederate Government […] Typically, the petitioners
asked for the exemption from military service of a skilled artisan, professing that the
neighborhood could not function without the individual.” Blair concludes that mountain regions
such as the Shenandoah were of even greater need of male labor because they had few slaves,
“the Shenandoah Valley expressed these needs more than the tobacco belt, where slaves helped
fill artisan positions.” In the plantation belt, slave labor could be instituted in the place of lost
white manpower; however in the Shenandoah, their limited slave population was not enough to
fulfill these roles. Blair‟s statement can also be applied to Western North Carolina, where slave
populations were significantly less than the coastal plains of North Carolina.177 With fewer
slaves to perform both skilled and unskilled task, it becomes very understandable why many
mountain communities resisted the conscription of the last remaining men at home. Writing from
his command post in Western North Carolina, Colonel William Holland Thomas recognized this
inherent problem:
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Two causes have deprived this portion of North Carolina of the means of subsistence:
First having but a few slaves among the whites and none among the Indians deprived the
country of the necessary amount of labor, after nearly all the men between eighteen and
forty-five had volunteered; second, it was a bad crop year, and the early frosts destroyed
a large portion of the corn crops or materially injured them. It is this condition of the
country that has produced starvation, and if not arrested will produce much disloyalty to
the South at a time when we have no men to spare.178
As Colonel Thomas‟s letter demonstrates, Western North Carolinians were in a perilous situation
by the middle of the war. With the continuous loss of men, the region constantly suffered from
food shortages. Thomas understood that if the Confederacy continued to conscript men from
Appalachia, the citizens in the region would become increasingly more agitated towards the
Confederacy, which would breed disloyalty.
While North Carolinians fought for the exemption of valuable men in their communities,
some were outraged by the government‟s exclusion of slave owners who had twenty or more
slaves. In an effort to keep quell the fear and anxiety over the possibility of slave uprisings;
Confederate authorities permitted the exemption of one white male for every twenty slaves on
each plantation. Some Western North Carolinians resented the law; John Inscoe explains that
they “felt that the wealthy were being offered a way of out of the military that was unavailable to
the poor.”179 Of all 4,065 slaveholders in North Carolina owning twenty or more slaves, ten
percent, 385 owners resided in Western North Carolina.180 Despite the relatively low number in
Appalachia, many citizens were still forced to look on as planters in the mountains and
throughout the state were granted exemptions by Confederate authorities while their
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communities were drained of their few remaining men. One North Carolinian, from a piedmont
county summed up the frustrations of many of his Western North Carolina neighbors when he
asked for North Carolina government officials to “try to reason with the authorities no to call out
any more men over forty years old, for we cannot spare them without bringing famine on our
land, and the other is to demand the Congress in the name of the people, the repeal of that odious
and disagreeable law—the 20 negro exemption act.”181 This letter brings to light, the plight felt
by many Appalachian citizens. As the conscription acts slowly bled more and more men from the
mountains, local citizens watched as planters stayed at home. Although the Confederacy‟s
drafting of the “20 negro exemption” act had the purpose of preventing slave revolts, many
yeomen viewed the act as a way to cater to the rich. This act created a false belief among many
in the region that Appalachian Confederates were fighting “rich man‟s war, and a poor man‟s
fight.” In areas of the South, where slave populations were much larger, it is likely that the “20
negro act” garnered a much stronger reprisal from citizens who perceived the act as unfair.
However, in both the upper and lower South, many southerners resented the law.182
While those on the home front resisted further removal of valuable men from their
communities, many soldiers and officers in the army were less opposed to the Conscription Acts.
In his study on the Twenty-Sixth North Carolina Regiment, Earl J. Hess argues that any
“dissatisfaction among the regimental members was muted as everyone acquiesced to the
inevitable.” Hess cites one anonymous soldier from the Twenty-Sixth who stated, “The
Conscription Law produces very little effect here. All cheerfully submit to it as a military
necessity, and are more determined than ever, by the help of God, to make short work with old
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Abe.” While some soldiers viewed the conscription acts as a usurpation of power, many soldiers
understood the policies as a necessary war measure. Throughout the army North Carolina units
took advantage of conscription by bringing conscripts into their depleted ranks.183 Although
many on the home front produced petitions in an effort to keep valuable tradesmen and farmers
at home, most Western North Carolina soldiers were opposed to unnecessary exemptions.
Similar to many North Carolinians, Louisianans, according to John Sacher, also welcomed new
conscripts, “Not all Louisianans displayed misgivings regarding conscription. Men in the army
expressed their desire that shirkers be compelled to join them in the ranks.”184 For many soldiers,
conscription was seen as a policy that forced cowards into the army. But soldiers in the army also
understood that the conscription of some men would be detrimental to the home front.
In a letter home, Benjamin Justice, advised his wife to not sign an exemption petition for
the release of a man at home. He stated, “I do not think it advisable to hire Bob Locust if John or
Bill either can do as well. I would not advise you to have anything to do with the petition for his
exemption from conscription or impressment. You could not conscientiously do so if you do not
desire to employ him.”185 This excerpt reveals how Justice and many other soldiers rationalized
exemptions. Justice believed that men who were needed at home should be exempted, yet he was
strongly opposed to exemptions for men who were not needed at home. Justice is symbolic of
many Western North Carolina Confederates, these Confederates wanted those who were needed
at home to stay, but they welcomed the conscription of men who were not pertinent to the
survival their families on the home front.
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Another Confederate took a slightly more sympathetic approach to conscription and the
problems it created for those at home. When W. J. O. Daniel heard that the local Gaston County
doctor was subject to conscription, he stated that “I hope that Doc will be left at home. He will
bee of more use to the Neighborhood at home than he will bee in the army.” This soldier
concluded that “we kneed recruits verry bad,” but in Gaston County, “I dont think their is any
their to spare.” This soldier understood the peculiar problem that plagued Confederates during
the war. Writing only weeks after he participated in the battle at Gettysburg, he recognized that
the army desperately needed more men, but he also sympathized with those at home. Taking
those last remaining men on the home front, would only hurt his family and community, placing
a greater risk on their ability to survive.186
In March of 1865, the Daily Confederate pleaded for Congress to “call forth all the
strength of the country. Let it take every available man, regardless of age, and put him in the
army. […] make every white man a soldier, subject to military law and discipline. Have
conscription rigidly enforced; change enrolling officers often, sending old ones to the field and
taking others.” By this late date in the war, the pleas made by the Daily Confederate largely fell
upon deaf ears. Western North Carolina like much of the South had no more men to spare for
service. Conscription was met with opposition in Western North Carolina, but those who fought
for the exemptions of men at home, did so largely out of a need to survive. But, disaffection over
the Confederacy‟s conscription policies does not necessarily allude to a weakening of
Confederate nationalism in Appalachia. Signs of “disaffection on the home front and within the
army can mask the significant portion of the citizenry who still hoped for independence despite
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losing hope and confidence in their government.”187 Western North Carolinians‟ resistance to
conscription was not done through an effort to undermine the Confederacy. As the letters and
petitions in this chapter have demonstrated, those on the home front resisted conscription on the
grounds that they had no men to spare. Similar to those at home, soldiers in the army also
recognized that men were needed at home and in the army. While they wanted to see every
available man conscripted, they recognized that some exemptions were necessary.
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CHAPTER FOUR: DISLOYATLY AND UNIONISM IN WESTERN
NORTH CAROLINA
The political system in North Carolina demonstrated a remarkable resilience throughout
the war. North Carolina managed to successfully hold two gubernatorial elections during this
period; these elections played a significant role in deciding how the state would prosecute the
war. The successes of Zebulon Vance in the 1862 and 1864 gubernatorial races were a testament
to North Carolina‟s willingness to achieve honorable peace only through Confederate
independence. In both elections, the majority of Western North Carolina voters cast their votes
for Vance, thus demonstrating their willingness to see the war through. Despite the successes of
Vance, he did not run unopposed. William Holden‟s 1864 campaign and the subsequent rise of
the peace movement underlined a strong minority opposition within North Carolina. By
promising a quick end to the war, Holden would, by late 1863, become a strong opponent of
Vance and the state‟s pro-war agenda. Although Holden would lose the 1864 gubernatorial
election, his initial success and popularity among a minority of North Carolinians demonstrates
how a small, but significant portion of North Carolina citizens were willing to consider peace
negotiations with the United States as a means to end the war.
In an effort to promote a united front in their fight for independence, the Confederacy
abandoned the political parties associated with antebellum politics and adopted a non-party
system. In North Carolina, the state followed suit by dropping the Democrat and Whig party
affiliations that most Confederate politicians had been associated with before the state‟s exit
from the Union. Marc Kruman explains, “The partisanship that had divided North Carolinians
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for so many years would cease, and words that stood as symbols of that division—Democrat,
Whig, Secessionist, Unionist would disappear from the political vocabulary. North Carolina
would be a unit, unanimous in its determination to repel the northern invader.”188 Former prosecession Democrats and Whigs adopted the new label, calling themselves the “Confederates.”
However, the broad appeal of the Confederate Party did not succeed in quelling old party
alignments. While former secessionists joined the Confederate party, most former Unionists
were hesitant to align themselves with those whom they bitterly fought against during the
secession crisis. Instead, former Whigs and Unionist Democrats gravitated to the new
“conservative party.” Although old party lines remained largely intact after North Carolina‟s
secession, the political climate in North Carolina shifted away from discussions over railroads,
state funding, and taxes. Old party platforms were thrown out for new political battles over
which party could better fight for independence. Marc Kruman finds that “No longer did
participants discuss the virtues of railroads and plank roads, or the democrazation of suffrage
requirements or equalization of taxation. Instead politicians sought to prove that their party and
candidate were the more loyal to the Confederacy, would bring the more efficient administration
to the state government, and were the more opposed to political parties.”189 By late 1861, all
other political issues had taken a backseat to one overriding issue; political contests would now
be based over who could better prosecute the war and end the war soonest. As the war waged on
and depredations and famine in North Carolina increased, each political side would portray
themselves as the most efficient group who could alleviate the needs of North Carolina and
defend her from the northern army.
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The Confederate party North Carolina came under heavy scrutiny for the early defeats
occurring in North Carolina, which were primarily on the coast. By mid 1862, the rise of a new
political movement spearheaded by former Whigs, Unionists, and other disgruntled factions
within the state, would attract the support of most Western North Carolina soldiers and citizens.
The Conservative movement portrayed the Confederate leadership as inept and blamed them for
the recent military setbacks which occurred throughout 1861. Conservatives made the argument
that “Democrats had been unprepared to meet the exigencies created by the war. The state
administration, they charged, established a weak and porous coastal defense, armed the state‟s
troops inadequately, and squandered public funds.”190 Portraying the Confederate Party as a
group unable to protect the state and its citizens, the Conservatives argued that they were better
suited to carry the state through the war. The Conservative party would solidify their dominance
in state politics after the triumph over the Democrats in the 1862 governor‟s race.
The Conservative party‟s nomination of Zebulon Baird Vance from Buncombe County
secured much of the Western North Carolina vote. Vance was born in Buncombe County, North
Carolina in 1830, and resided in the region for much of his life. Before the war, Vance was a
young and aspiring politician. He first got his start in politics in 1854, running as a Whig, he won
a seat in the North Carolina House of Commons. After two terms in the House of Commons,
Vance returned to Buncombe County in 1856. In 1858, Vance won a recently vacated
congressional seat. He would again return to Congress for a second term in 1859. Like many
Western North Carolinians, Vance was a staunch Unionist. However, like many Unionists,
Vance abandoned hope for the Union when President Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers in
190

Kruman, Parties and Politics in North Carolina, 1836-1865, 237.

108

reaction to Fort Sumter. At the time when the news of Fort Sumter reached North Carolina,
Congressman Vance was preaching at a Unionist rally in Raleigh. When he received word that
South Carolina had fired and Fort Sumter, and Lincoln responded by calling for troops, he gave
up hope for reconciliation between the North and South. According to Vance, “I immediately,
with altered voice and manner, called upon the assembled multitude to volunteer, not to fight
against, but for South Carolina […] if war must come I preferred to be with my own people. If
we had to shed blood I preferred to shed Northern rather than Southern blood.” On May 3, 1861,
seventeen days before North Carolina seceded from the Union, Vance decided to enlist in the
Confederate army. Although he had no military experience, Vance “joined a Buncombe County
company known as the Rough and Ready Guards and was soon elected captain.” Shortly
thereafter, Vance would be promoted to colonel of the Twenty-Sixth North Carolina Regiment.
Despite being nominated for governor, Vance declined to leave his regiment in order to
campaign, relying on his supporters to run his election efforts. Vance would command his
regiment through various battles including New Bern on the North Carolina coast. After being
repelled by Union General Ambrose Burnside‟s assault, Vance and his regiments were sent north
to Virginia, arriving in time to participate at Malvern Hill. 191
In response to the nomination of Colonel Vance for governor, the Confederate Party
nominated William Johnston, a railroad executive and former state commissary general. The
Confederate Party members tried to denounce Vance as a Unionist, claiming that he was not
supportive of the Confederate cause. However, attempts to call into question Vance‟s loyalty
were not effective. Gordon McKinney explains that since “Vance was actually putting his life on
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the line for the cause so fervently dear to the hearts of Confederates, their attacks on him were, of
necessity muted.”192 Throughout the campaign, the Conservative party‟s offensive was led by the
popular newspaper owner and editor William Holden of the North Carolina Standard. With the
help of Holden and his newspaper, the Conservative movement was successful in portraying
Johnston as “an original secessionist, claiming that such secessionists in the Confederate and
state governments were responsible for poor progress in winning or ending the war, growing
inflation, lack of support for soldiers and their families, and conscription.”193 In the end, Vance‟s
popularity, with the help of Holden, was no match for William Johnston and the Confederate
party. Throughout the state, citizens had become too disenchanted by Confederate policies and
recent military blunders. The election resulted in a landslide victory for Vance. Of all the soldiers
in the army who voted, Vance received sixty-six percent of their vote. Among North Carolinians
as a whole, Vance received seventy-three percent of the votes cast. 194 Mirroring the rest of the
state, Western North Carolinians demonstrated heavy support for Vance. In Appalachia, Johnson
only carried twenty-three percent of the popular vote (see tab. 3).195 Vance would carry every
Western North Carolina County except Mecklenburg County, which was home to his
opponent.196 After the success of Vance, the Confederate party would no longer play a
significant role in North Carolina politics. Following the 1862 gubernatorial race and the
collapse of the Confederate party, the Conservative movement would become the only vibrant
party in North Carolina.
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Table 3: 1862 Gubernatorial Election.

Historian Marc Kruman contends that the 1862 elections established the dominance of
the Conservative party in North Carolina. The “gubernatorial election of 1862, North Carolina
voters repudiated the party that had dominated the state‟s politics for more than a decade. The
defeat suffered by the Democrats was worse than any party had suffered over the previous two
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decades.”197 Following the defeat of the Confederate party, most former Democrats and
Confederate party supporters began to support Vance and the Conservative movement. After
backing William Johnston in the 1862 election, the Asheville News acknowledged their approval
of Governor Vance. In a review of a Vance speech in Buncombe County, the newspaper wrote
that his speech was “all that the most ardent Southern man could desire.” The paper stated that
“We, in common with the large crowd present, were pleased with Gov. Vance‟s speech. It was
patriotic, encouraging and well timed, and is; we believe an index to a vigorous and patriotic
administration of our State affairs.”198 Similar to the Asheville News, the few Western North
Carolinians who voted for William Johnston found it easy to cast their support for Governor
Vance. Vance‟s appeal to both North Carolina and the Confederacy made him an acceptable
governor for both the Conservatives and Confederates in North Carolina. One staunch
secessionist who had been opposed to Vance‟s election changed his opinion of the governor after
hearing his inaugural address. In a letter to Governor Vance, Toliver Davis stated, “Although we
have not agreed heretofore in Politics, your speech at Raleigh was all I could have desired, and I
feel it my duty to give you whatever influence and support to your administration my influence
can permit.” Davis also spoke of his hope that Vance‟s Governorship could secure the loyalties
of those citizens not overly enthusiastic about Confederate independence. Davis stated that he
hoped that Vance could “arouse” those who “have been lukewarm in the Cause and make them
active. I hope your Action will have the effect to unite us all as one.”199 Toliver‟s statement
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reveals how loyalties in Western North Carolina were varied, and some citizens may have been
only partial to the idea of a Confederate independence.
With the collapse of their opposition, the Conservative movement would soon become
prone to internal fissures. Marc Kruman contends that “It is in the context of the demise of the
Democratic party that the growing divisions in the Conservative party must be viewed.” He
explained that the division among Conservatives did not threaten the success of the party itself.
He continues that if “the Democrats had remained a viable opposition, the only way the
Conservatives would have attained success would have been through unity. With the Democrats
dead at the state level and in most parts of the state, Conservatives could afford interparty
squabbling and division.” With only themselves to compete against, the Conservative party
would slowly begin to burst at the seams. The division in the party would fall along two lines,
William Holden and Governor Vance. Both Holden and Vance would argue in 1864 that they
were the true Conservative party candidate. Despite their shared claims, they had quite different
plans for North Carolina.200
William Holden and Zebulon Vance were men of completely different upbringings.
Whereas Vance was born into a prestigious family, Holden was born out of wedlock in 1818 in
Orange County, North Carolina. Growing up in poverty, Holden had no formal education;
however he did begin an apprenticeship at the age of ten working for the local newspaper, the
Hillsborough Recorder. After his apprenticeship, Holden bounced around the state working with
various different papers. In 1841, Holden received his license to practice law, and slowly became
affluent among local Democratic and Whig party leaders in Raleigh. By 1843, Holden would
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accept the position as editor of the North Carolina Standard, the Democratic Party organ.
Holden would go on to become a powerful party organizer for the Democrats until the secession
crisis began.201 Throughout the secession crisis, Holden held firm to his Unionist ties, which
alienated him from the Democratic Party. In the early summer of 1860, he boasted that “no
reason exist why North Carolina should contemplate at this time dissolution of the Union.”
However prominent this opinion may have been among his Whig counterparts, the Democrats
did not think highly of his Unionist sentiments. In the fall of 1860, “Holden‟s pro-Union stand
brought immediate retribution upon him, for when the state legislature convened in November, it
replaced him as state printer.” With the divorce of Holden and his Democrat allies, he would
begin to align himself with the Whigs, where his Unionist feelings were welcomed. On
November 30, 1860, he would take part in a Unionist rally with then Congressman Zebulon
Vance. However, after the events surrounding Fort Sumter, Holden like the rest of the Unionist
holdouts accepted secession. As a state delegate to North Carolina‟s secession convention,
Holden signed the state‟s ordinance of secession on May 20, 1861.202
After Vance‟s victory over William Johnston, Vance rewarded Holden for his loyalty by
reinstituting as the state editor. Initially “the relationship between the new governor and Holden
was a close one. The North Carolina Standard supported administrative policy, and Holden
served as an advisor whose counsel Vance sought.” But this relationship would be short lived.203
As the harshness of the war intensified and suffering of North Carolina citizens increased,
Holden began to radicalize his views on the war. As “discontent with the war grew, Holden
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reflected and encouraged it with a shift in his position toward the attainment of peace.”204 Giving
counsel to Vance, Holden argued that North Carolina should begin unilateral peace discussions
with the North. Vance on the other hand disagreed, contending that any discussions of peace
could only be made on the terms of peace with independence. Additionally, Vance countered that
North Carolina could not act unilaterally; only Richmond could decide whether an honorable
peace should be pursued. Horace W. Raper explains that after having “failed to gain Vance‟s
acceptance of his ideas,” Holden “turned his thoughts to ways of ending Vance‟s career and
replacing him with someone who could be more amenable to his own plans.”205 Turning to his
newspaper, Holden attempted to gain the support of North Carolinians. Knowing that many
North Carolinians were disaffected with recent military setbacks in addition to the Conscription
Act, Holden tried to rally the people around him. In an editorial, Holden argued that the “power
to make war and the power to make peace is lodged with the Confederate government. We
advocate the exercise of the peace making as well as the war-making power, and we do so in
strict accordance with the Constitution itself.” His willingness to negotiate with the United States
for peace created a divide within the Conservative party. Through his paper, Holden began to
advocate for communities in North Carolina to conduct peace meetings, which many
communities began doing. As Holden began to construct a peace movement, the battles lines of
the 1864 gubernatorial race would be drawn.206
By early 1864 a minority of Conservatives led by Holden had been advocating for peace
meetings in the state for many months. However, as the war entered a third year, he raised the
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stakes when he asked for the coordination of a state convention to discuss the possibility of peace
with the United States. Governor Vance and the majority of the Conservative party were opposed
to any mention of peace that did not come with honorable independence. Marc Kruman explains
that the promotion of a peace convention by Holden was the final blow that divided the
Conservative party: “The split in the Conservative party over the convention question broadened
into open political warfare in March, 1864, when William Holden announced himself as a
gubernatorial candidate opposed to the reelection of Governor Vance.”207 Holden spoke out
against the opponents within his party and their opposition to peace meetings and the convention
when he stated that it “may be true that these meetings are injurious to the common cause,
though it must be confessed I cannot perceive what harm there is in attempting to negotiate
peace, while fighting for it”208 The 1864 gubernatorial election in North Carolina in many ways
can be interpreted as a referendum on the war. Citizens and soldiers of North Carolina were
allowed to make a choice on whether they would like to fight for their independence or to open
discussions for peace, and possibly reconstruction.
Holden‟s decision to advocate peace negotiations and run for governor emerged after
North Carolinians began to express discontent over the way the war was being fought. A large
portion of Holden‟s support derived from citizens who had suffered from violence or were
without food and had received little or no relief from Confederate authorities in the region. With
the fall of East Tennessee and the simultaneous rise in the demand for Confederate troops,
Western North Carolina became increasingly vulnerable to attacks from deserters, Yankee raids,
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and Unionist bands. John Inscoe notes that by late 1863, the “ineffectiveness of the Confederate
military was brought home to residents of Western North Carolina.” He concludes that the
“inability of the Confederate army to defend mountain residents or maintain order in the
highlands further undermined civilian morale in the region.”209 One Asheville correspondent
reported to the Western Democrat that “citizens of this section have suffered enormously within
the last twelve months.” The author continued that “Scarcely a week has passed that has not
witnessed the robbery of some poor soldiers family, or the murder of a good soldier or citizen.
Several families have been so thoroughly robbed that actual suffering and almost starvation has
been the consequence.” As the increase in famine and violence spread throughout Western North
Carolina, the loyalties of many citizens would be tested. Although many Appalachian men and
women would endure the hardships of the conflict and stay loyal to the Confederacy, others
would begin to lose faith in the cause. Loyalties in the region would be severely tested and some
would decide that the suffering and hardships of the war were not worth the price of Confederate
independence.
At a public meeting in Buncombe County, an undesignated amount of citizens stated that
“we are tired of this desolating, ruinous war, and will vote for no man to represent us in any form
who will not publicly pledge himself to make use of the first, and all the means in his power to
bring about a reconciliation between the contending parties.”210 Throughout Western North
Carolina, some communities began to openly discuss their willingness to see a peaceful end to
the war. These Western North Carolina citizens throughout 1863 and 1864 would be vocal and
outspoken over their intentions to bring about an end to the conflict. In September 1863, one
209
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group of Western North Carolinians stated that “we are in favor of an immediate cessation of
hostilities, and of holding a Convention jointly by the two governments for the purpose of
negotiating a peace alike to both sections.”211 These citizens represented a significant portion of
Holden‟s base of support, who had given up faith in the Confederate Government. These
civilians‟ willingness to seek reunion with the North reveals how some Western North
Carolinians‟ by the middle of the war had abandoned hopes for Confederate independence. The
military defeats and the rising death toll persuaded them that the Confederacy was not feasible.
By early 1863 Holden‟s newspaper would become North Carolina‟s organ for those who
wished for immediate peace and an end to the conflict. One individual from Transylvania County
wrote to Holden during the campaign, “We up this way, like yourself, desire peace, but are
fearful that fighting will never bring it. We are among those who have always believed that every
blow stricken in this fight made it worse.”212 Similar sentiments were expressed in a Watauga
County meeting where an unidentified number of citizens stated that “we deem it our duty as
freemen of North Carolina to meet in public council and express our views in regard to the
policy of further prosecuting this bloody and inhuman war.” The group concluded that “peace
cannot be restored merely by fighting. This we think is now apparent to all.”213 Holden‟s promise
that he would open peace negotiations attracted many Western North Carolinians who were no
longer willing to fight for the Confederacy.
In addition to promising an end to the war, Holden was hailed by many to be North
Carolina‟s defender against a tyrannical central government. Holden‟s frequent critiques of the
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Confederate government in Richmond attracted many Western North Carolinians who saw the
Davis administration as a growing military despotism. By early 1863, many citizens had become
unhappy with the increasing power of the Confederate government. A significant portion of
Appalachian citizens expressed outrage over President Davis‟s decision to suspend Habeas
Corpus and the lack of North Carolina leadership within the Confederacy. Although North
Carolina was sending more troops into battle than any other Confederate state excluding
Virginia, few North Carolinians were rising up within the ranks of the Confederacy. Additionally
many Western North Carolinians looked upon Davis‟s suspension of Habeas Corpus as a direct
attack on Holden and the North Carolina Standard in an effort to quell his criticism over the
war.214 In addition to this, the appointment of officers from other states to be in charge of North
Carolina troops added to the appearance that Richmond and Davis were encroaching upon North
Carolina‟s sovereignty.
At a peace meeting in Wilkes County, the attendees stated, “That we regard the policy of
the Confederate government in its disregard of the habeas corpus act, and in appointing
physicians and other officers over North Carolinians as an indignity offered to the citizens of
North Carolina to which they should never submit; and we therefore demand their removal, and
North Carolinians alone hold officers in and over North Carolinians.” 215 When a North Carolina
officer injured in combat was replaced by an officer from another state, an anonymous soldier
wrote a letter to the Standard stating, “When the commandant of our Camp of Instruction was
disabled, by wounds received in gallant service, from discharging his duties, his place was
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supplied not by a North Carolinian […] but by a native of another state—a foreigner.”216 At a
meeting of Yadkin County citizens, the participants resolved that “we do not intend to submit
any longer to the gross insults to North Carolina, from the Confederate government at Richmond
in the appointment of officers from other states to offices in North Carolina”217 These Western
North Carolinians wanted their soldiers to be led and cared for by fellow North Carolinians.
Furthermore, their resistance to non-native officers within their state underlines the fact that
North Carolinians were concerned over what they perceived to be the constricting of their
sovereignty by the Confederate Government.
One particular controversy over appointments sparked outrage among many North
Carolinians. The Confederate government placed a Virginian in charge of collecting taxes for
North Carolina. For Western North Carolinians this act by Davis only added to their suspicion
that Richmond was growing too strong. John Inscoe notes that although it may have been in
reality a minor issue, the protesting of a Virginia native as the tax collector for North Carolina
“served as a symbolic means of protesting Davis‟s administration of the war effort.” Although
this appointment did not greatly change or affect the lives of North Carolinians, “the
unpopularity of the Richmond government was clearly one of the most important motivating
forces behind the meetings.”218 At a gathering of citizens in Buncombe County, the group
resolved that “we do protest against the appointment of a man from Virginia or any other State to
collect the tithes in North Carolina.” These citizens concluded that “we know North Carolina has
men possessed of every qualification to fill that office and that we will pay our tithes to no man,
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save a North Carolinian”219 For these Appalachian citizens, Holden was viewed as the only hope
in curbing the growing power of the Davis administration. For those Western North Carolinians
whose loyalty to the Confederacy had been severely strained, Holden‟s promises of peace
negotiations and the restoration of civil authority was met with enthusiasm and support.
For many Western North Carolinians, Holden‟s promise of peace negotiations meant an
end to the war, but it also represented an end to the conscription law. From its first inception,
Holden had been vehemently opposed to the conscription laws. In early 1863 Holden stated,
“North Carolina has never acquiesced in the principle of conscription, and never will. She
regards it as unconstitutional, despotic and dangerous to liberty.” On occasions, Holden would
often cater to his Appalachian supporters by bringing to light the devastating effects conscription
was having on the region: “we honestly believe that it would be unwise, unjust, and deeply
injurious to North Carolina to enforce those laws, especially in our Western Counties, where
there are comparatively no slaves, and where their overflowing patriotism has nearly emptied
them of fighting or working men.”220 As chapter three revealed, Western North Carolina
communities had become drained of able bodied men to work and protect the home front. Many
citizens in the mountains recognized that if Holden won the 1864 race one of his first orders of
business would be to suspend conscription of North Carolina citizens. Many in the mountains
became frustrated with watching as their communities increasingly sent away older men and
those at home became worse off. The attendees of an August 26, 1863, peace meeting in
Buncombe County expressed the plight of many Western North Carolinians when they
complained that “the President having called upon this State for the conscripts of forty to forty
219
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five, we deem it unjust to the best interest of the State that any more troops be furnished until
their just quota of men.”221 These citizens felt that North Carolina had done its part for the
Confederacy, but as the need for men increased many in the mountains became vocal about their
disdain for conscription and Richmond‟s heavy handed policies.
Throughout his campaign, Holden kept his plans for peace broad and unclear; however he
was adamant that reconstruction of the Union was not his objective. Holden understood that
while some of his supporters were ardent Unionists, many others wanted peace but still viewed
the North as an enemy. Therefore, Holden was forced to keep the details for his plans for peace
imprecise in an effort not to push away any of his supporters. The varied views held by Holden‟s
supporters reveal how disloyalty was not the same among everyone. While some citizens wanted
to rejoin the Union, others simply wanted a cease-fire between the North and South. A
significant portion of his base still viewed the North as an enemy and did not desire to rejoin the
United States. Holden‟s more moderate base of supporters were vocal that they wanted to hold a
peace convention, but did not appear to want a reunion with the North. One group of North
Carolinians stated that “it is perfectly clear to the minds of all sensible people that this war can
never be settled by the sword.” These citizens stated that they wanted a convention to discuss the
possibility of peace with the North, but “it is the least of our intention to give aid and comfort to
the enemy; and we would here urge out soldiers the duty they have sworn to perform. Stand by
your colors, while your friends at home tender the olive branch of peace.”222 These citizens,
unlike Holden‟s more extreme Unionist supporters, were not willing to totally end all fighting
221
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with the North. However, they did want to open peace negotiations with the United States while
simultaneously fighting.
Shortly before election day Holden insisted, “We want no submission, we want no
subjugation, we want no more war if it be possible to stop it, but we want peace.”223 Because of
Holden‟s encouragement of peace meetings and his promotion of a peace convention, he was
branded as a Unionist by his opponents. Despite his insistence that he did not want
reconstruction of the Union, few North Carolinians believed that Holden did not want a reunion
with the North. John Inscoe explains that “Confederate party members and moderate
Conservatives led by Governor Vance were appalled by calls for a convention to negotiate
peace.”224 As Holden‟s peace campaign slowly grew momentum, many Conservatives
throughout the state would strike back against his calls for peace. Competing newspapers would
lash out at Holden and the Standard for his positions. In Western North Carolina, some
communities would begin to isolate and speak out against citizens who advocated peace. Well
before Holden announced his candidacy for governor, many citizens and soldiers in Western
North Carolina rejected Holden‟s calls for peace negotiations. His constant critiques of the
Confederacy and the Davis Administration sparked skepticism over Holden‟s loyalties among
Conservative North Carolinians. Holden‟s newspaper was soon labeled as a traitor‟s paper.
Holden‟s opponents would claim that they were advocates of peace as well; however they only
desired a peace that would accompany Confederate independence.225
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Although most Western North Carolinians desperately wanted peace, many were quick to
deny any prospect of peace which did not accompany independence. One anonymous letter from
Buncombe County was published in an August 31, 1863, copy of the Spirit of the Age. The
author claimed to speak for many in the county when he or she stated “No peace with our
enemies except on the basis of complete independence of the Southern Confederacy.” The author
continued that the morale of the people in Buncombe County was good, except for a few who
had been influenced by a certain “Tory Paper,” most likely referring to the North Carolina
Standard.226 In a September 1863 article, the editor of the Western Democrat spoke directly to
Holden and his supporters when he stated that “those in the South who are holding peace
meetings are entirely mistaken if they suppose they can get peace by compromise or reunion
with the yankee nation.” The editor stated that everyone in the in North Carolina was desperate
for peace, but only a “complete separation from the North will secure this, therefore we urge
union and harmony among our people and liberal support of the Government in order that the
war may be prosecuted with vigor and determination, and that the enemy may be convinced that
the Southern people will never submit.”227 In another article, the Spirit of the Age attacked
Holden and his supporters when it stated “the only hope of having peace at all, is in conquering
it. No paper resolutions, no proposals, no conference, will be of any avail to save lives, liberty,
and property, unless forced at the point of bayonet.”228 Throughout North Carolina, the majority
of newspapers, citizens and soldiers would vehemently oppose any discussion of peace or
compromise with the North. In Western North Carolina, many citizens would respond to peace
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meetings by coming together in their own meetings, and passing resolutions, declaring loyalty to
the Confederate cause and their opposition to peace without independence.
At one public meeting in Union County, a “large portion of the citizens” published their
opposition to peace proposals and the possibility of reconstruction. The citizens at the meeting
resolved that they “utterly loath the idea of submission to or fraternizing with a people who have
murdered our sons and brothers, devastated the fairest portion of our country.” This underlines
how the harshness of war did not weaken their resolve, but strengthened it. The deaths of their
brothers and sons at the hands of the enemy solidified and strengthened their Confederate
identity, polarizing any mention of reconciliation with the United States. In another resolution
they addressed the topic of peace, “we sincerely desire peace we say with a full appreciation of
the responsibilities we assume, and of the character of the contest in all its bearings, that we
desire it only on terms of a complete and final separation from our enemies politically, socially
and otherwise.”229 As peace advocates had become more outspoken against the war, Appalachia
witnessed “a strong reaction by the Southern nationalists in the mountains.”230 These Union
County citizens wanted to see an end to the war, but like a majority Western North Carolina
communities, they were unwilling to accept a peace that did not accompany full independence of
the Confederacy.
Aside from calling their own meetings, loyal citizens also attended peace meetings and
disrupted them. Throughout Western North Carolina, loyal citizens lashed out against their
neighbors who called for meetings to discuss peace negotiations. One citizen from Gaston
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County wrote the editor of the Western Democrat and informed him that a peace meeting in their
county failed after large crowds converged. He explained that “The proposed „public meeting‟ in
Gaston county, to agitate for a Convention, was a dead failure […] a crowd gathered at Dallas,
more than two-thirds of which was utterly opposed to holding the meeting.” The author of the
letter concluded that “Gaston county has done her share nobly in this war, and her true citizens
have determined that she shall not be disgraced by a few disloyal, factious spirits.”231 This letter
reveals that despite being the minority, proponents of peace movement still challenged the loyal
status quo in Gaston County when they tried to conduct a peace meeting. At another peace
meeting in Greensboro, North Carolina, citizens grew so hostile that the speaker could not put up
any resolution to a vote. The writer boasted that “the crowd cheered, hissed, screamed and
applauded in such a manner that every effort to be heard or to organize was utterly in vain. The
resolutions could not be read. The crowd used all kinds of abusive and ridiculous epithets
rendering the appearance of the supreme speaker ludicrous.” The author continued that the
majority of the community abhorred any mention of peace that did not come with independence.
He concluded that “The whole town seems to feel indignant at their course, and would like to see
them suffer for their attempt to get up a traitor meeting.”232 Attempts to establish peace meetings
in both Gaston County and Greensboro reveal how only a small, but motivated, portion of
Western North Carolina were willing to discuss plans for a peace that did not include
independence. While the majority of Western North Carolina citizens were unwilling to accept
peace without independence, Holden and his Appalachian followers underline a divide that
existed in Western North Carolina.
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Table 4: 1864 Gubernatorial Election.

Unfortunately for Holden and his supporters, the 1864 governor‟s race resulted in a
landslide victory for Governor Vance. Holden would lose every Appalachian county, except for
Wilkes County, in which he only defeated Vance by approximately 100 hundred votes. In
Western North Carolina, Holden only won a meager twenty-one percent of the popular vote. (see
tab. 4). The voting pattern in the mountains nearly mirrored the statewide results, where Holden
only garnered nineteen percent of the vote. Of the 72,561 North Carolinians who voted, Vance
defeated Holden by a margin of 43,579 votes. 233 As the results demonstrate, only a minority of
Western North Carolinians and North Carolinians in general would cast their ballots for the
233
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Conservative Peace candidate. However the success of Holden in Wilkes County reveals that
Appalachia was not completely uniform in its sentiments towards the war. Some counties such as
Wilkes were likely experiencing a more significant level of disaffection with the war. But
overall, most of Western North Carolina was solidified in its choice to reelect Vance. Although
Holden commanded a devout and vocal following in the mountains, they proved to be far too
small. In the face of heavy campaigning on the part of Governor Vance, Holden was unable to
successfully build upon his base. John Inscoe contends that Holden “won only Wilkes County in
the mountains, and even here his margin of victory was very slight. The peace movement in
western North Carolina had been out campaigned and crushed in the climatic election of the
war.”234 Although most North Carolinians had become dissatisfied with the war, “they rejected
the alternative of returning to the old Union, where the Lincoln administration had, as they saw
it, snuffed out all liberty.”235 The 1864 governor‟s race can be viewed as a referendum on the
conflict. Highlanders went to the polls and overwhelmingly voted to reelect Governor Zebulon
Vance. In doing so, they voted to continue the war until the North accepted Confederate
independence.
Despite the devastating loss for Holden and the peace movement; the 1864 election did
not quell the dissent and disaffection existent among some in Western North Carolina.
Unfortunately for Vance, his victory coincided with military setbacks in the region; bringing
more starvation and violence to the citizens living in the mountains. In a letter to Governor
Vance anonymously signed by “a poor woman of North Carolina” the author pleaded for the
governor to end the war and send all the soldiers back home. In her early January 1865 letter,
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she requested that “for the sake of suffering women and children […] stop this cruel war.” The
author continued, “my husband has been killed, and if they all stay till they are killed what in the
name of God will become of us poor women and children.”236 Throughout Western North
Carolina, some civilians similar to this anonymous woman had by late in the war become
desperate for peace on any terms. This woman was likely a loyal Confederate at the beginning of
the war, but the loss of her husband and the starvation of her family over time wore away her
loyalties. For some, the price of Confederate independence was by early 1865 to high.
In the last two years of the war, violence and starvation in the region would increase,
placing an even greater strain on morale in Appalachia. After the failed attempt to retake
Knoxville in late 1863 and early 1864, Confederate forces permanently retired from East
Tennessee for the remainder of the war. From that point on, Western North Carolina would be
unprotected from Union military campaigns. In April 1864, J.K. Sass notified H.N Bohman, the
Chief Magistrate of South Carolina that the withdrawal of Longstreet‟s army from East
Tennessee had opened “all of Western North Carolina, Northeastern Georgia, and Northwestern
South Carolina to incursions of the enemy, and I know of no troops or even local organization to
oppose them.” With no protection from the enemy, Confederate morale in the region would
continue to falter, by 1864, many of those on the home front would become disillusioned with
the war. But disaffection with the war was not equally distributed in Appalachia. Although all
counties experienced violence, border counties often bore the brunt of much of the attacks in
Appalachia. John Inscoe explains that in “many instances, proximity to the Tennessee border
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shaped a community‟s proclivities toward Federal loyalism.” Inscoe continued that a “stronger
Unionist sentiment” often existed in the remote sections of many border counties.237
One soldier serving near the Tennessee border in Western North Carolina wrote to Vance
proclaiming that “I am fully satisfied that some of them have been encouraging desertion and
have gone under with the disloyal sentiment with at least one half of the people of the county.”
The Captain told Governor Vance that if he could not supply him with more troops, the county‟s
food supply for the winter would be in danger of destruction by the Yankees, “I think for the
protection of this county some regular troops ought to be sent to Watuga and Ashe Counties
immediately, and I urge that it be done.” He warned Vance that “if the Raiders or Yankees come
down in this Valley they will ruin and desolate all the homes of all good citizens that have stood
against the Tories.”238 In the last year of the war, violence and military operations in Western
North Carolina overwhelmed the regular and home guard troops. John Inscoe notes, “The last
nine months of the Civil War in western North Carolina thoroughly disrupted the traditional
society that had been constructed there. Towns, neighborhoods, and even families had been torn
asunder by economic deprivation and the violence brought on by both formal military
organizations and ad hoc bands of terrorists.”239 For Western North Carolinians, late 1864 and
1865 would bring about a new wave of military incursions that would devastate the region. A
January, 1865 raid led an Indiana Calvary Regiment would cut through much of the mountain
counties before finally turning back into East Tennessee unscathed. Unfortunately this attack
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precipitated a much larger cavalry offensive led by George H. Stoneman that would destroy
factories, depots, farms and homes. After Stoneman‟s raid, Appalachia would be thoroughly
ransacked, with little sustenance left for the survival of a war wearied populace. 240
The military raids into Western North Carolina were largely successful in destroying food
and war-making material throughout the region. Despite the Confederate defeats and failures to
defend the mountain communities, many loyal citizens showed uncommon valor in the face of an
overwhelming enemy. When Stoneman‟s cavalry invaded Watauga County in 1865, the Home
Guard attempted to defend the town of Boone. Although most home guard troops only fired one
or two volleys before retreating, one fifteen year old held his ground. Steel Frazier managed to
shoot and kill two of Stoneman‟s men before retreating into the woods nearby. 241 In her study on
Yadkin County during the Civil War, Frances H. Casstevens detailed another incident of rebel
defiance and bravery in the face of the enemy. According to Casstevens, a detail of Union
soldiers under Stoneman‟s command approached the home of Catherine Reece with the intent to
pillage the property. When the soldiers attempted to take the family mule, Reece stood in front of
the animal proclaiming, “Kill me, if you want, that‟s the only way you‟ll get my mule.” Taking
her claim seriously, Casstevens notes that the soldier in charge “ordered his men to leave her and
her mule alone.”242
Although few Western North Carolinians on the home front would have demonstrated the
bravery that Frazier or Mrs. Reece did, hardly anyone embraced the arrival of the Yankees.
Western North Carolinians on the home front may not have fought until the last man, but most
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citizens still felt disdain for the conquering Union armies. In her recent work on Sherman‟s
march through the Carolinas, Jacqueline Glass Campbell notes that “what Sherman and his men
anticipated as Unionism was not an accurate definition of the spirit of most North Carolinians
[…] discontent with their government did not equate to lack of faith in the Confederate nation.
Dissension and resistance were frequently attempts to negotiate an equitable distribution of the
burdens of war rather than expression of disloyalty.”243 While many Western North Carolinians
were vocal about their dissatisfaction with the war, few of them were willing to embrace their
Union invaders.
Throughout the war, only a very small minority of Western North Carolina men chose to
join the Union army. Statewide only 3,156 (three percent) of North Carolinians between the ages
of twenty and forty-nine fought for the Union army. According to Terrell Garren, the total
number of Appalachians who joined the Union army was 1,636 men, five percent of the male
population.244 The low number of Union enlistments in Appalachia and throughout the state
shows that although many were disloyal, only a small portion of that number were willing to join
the Union and fight against their neighbors. Gordon McKinney‟s study of 261 letters requesting
pardon written by Western North Carolinians to President Andrew Johnson provides insight into
Confederate loyalty within the region. Although Johnson intended to punish the Southern elite
after the war, McKinney reveals that most of “Johnson‟s correspondents from Western North
Carolina were much less elite than the president had anticipated […] The vast majority of the
applicants, however, were residents of western North Carolina who held minor civil offices in
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the Confederate government, primarily with the postal service and as local tax collectors.” One
would imagine that a citizen being forced to write a letter requesting pardon; he or she would
want to downplay their involvement within the Confederacy, or even state that they were
Unionists throughout the war. Only fifty-four letter writers state that they were Unionists before
and during the war, and forty-two writers claimed to be neutral throughout the conflict. In
contrast, ninety-nine letters proclaim that they were loyal Confederates during the course of the
war. Of these ninety-nine letters, forty-one writers admit that they were pro-secessionist before
North Carolina left the Union. There were an additional sixty-six letters where the authors
provide no information on whether they were loyal Confederates, Unionists, or impartial.
However, these sixty-six writers were likely loyal Confederates who did not want to admit to
being so, due to fear that they may be punished. McKinney notes that they “simply admitted to
assisting the Confederacy and requested a pardon. It is tempting to conclude that these were
people who welcomed the Confederacy and had no unionist loyalties to report.” McKinney‟s
study reveals that only a minority of Western North Carolinians were Unionists during the war,
while the majority was loyal Confederates. However, his finding that forty-two letters state they
were neutral demonstrates how some Western North Carolinians were impartial to the
Confederacy and the Union. This study underlines how loyalties in Western North Carolina
varied greatly, while most supported the cause, many others were Unionist or neutral.245
In Western North Carolina, the peace movement and increased disaffection with the
Confederacy rarely evolved into Appalachian men deciding to fight against the Confederacy by
taking up arms with the Union. Throughout the war, even when the peace movement was at its
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strongest, Confederate civil and military authority still operated without any serious hindrance
from Unionists. John Inscoe argues that “No combination of deserters, draft evaders, and
Unionists was strong enough to assume military control of any significant segment of the North
Carolina mountain counties. Even after Ambrose Burnside‟s army occupied Knoxville in July
1863, opposition to the war in Western North Carolina remained poorly organized and subject to
repression by state and national authorities.”246 Confederate authority remained so well
entrenched in the region largely because the majority of Western North Carolinians were loyal
citizens. Few of those who supported William Holden and the peace movement were willing to
go as far as joining the Union army. In reality, most Holden supporters simply wanted an end to
the hostilities.
Disloyalty existed in Western North Carolina, but it must be held in context of the war
itself. In a recent essay Gary Gallagher contends that “discovering such stresses in Confederate
society is roughly equivalent to finding sand on a beach. Every society in every place at every
time manifests class friction. The interesting question is not whether it exists, but whether it
shapes events decisively.”247 Of the 261 letters in Gordon McKinney‟s study, even those men
who argued that they were Unionists still continued to support the Confederacy by doing their
jobs, “These people continued to do their jobs until the end of the war and supported the
Confederacy in that way. This is indeed a crucial point. The actual commitment of the individual
is much less important than the actions that individual took.”248 From a Confederate nationalism
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perspective, these individuals still supported the Confederacy by performing their appointed
roles throughout the war. Although they may be held disdain for the Confederacy, their actions
only benefited the Confederacy. Disloyalty in Western North Carolina is revealing of the varying
levels of loyalty among Appalachian residents. However, the evidence does not show that the
region was never at risk of becoming a Unionist enclave, such as was the case in East
Tennessee.249 Unlike most East Tennesseans, Western North Carolinians believed that
supporting the Confederacy served their best interest. Most disloyalty in Western North Carolina
came from citizens who were only willing to dissent within the laws of the Confederate
government. The 1864 election demonstrated that most protests against the Confederate
government were done within the laws of the civil government. The popularity of peace
meetings revealed how Western North Carolinians attempted to bring about peace through the
ballot box and not through violence.
Western North Carolina citizens had varying levels of loyalty to the Confederate cause.
While many, if not most, remained loyal Confederates throughout the war, others were only
lukewarm or impartial to the idea of a Confederate nation. The 1864 gubernatorial race and the
general increase in disloyalty throughout the region illustrates that loyalties in Western North
Carolina were not polarized but changed over time. By 1863 some Western North Carolinians
who had once been supportive of the war began to change their opinion and decided that they
wanted to seek peaceful and quick end to the war, thus casting their votes for Holden. However,
just as the degree of loyalty of citizens had varied; disloyalty and dissent in Western North
Carolina was not all the same either. A significant minority of Western North Carolina citizens
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supported Holden in the 1864 election. But as this chapter has demonstrated, Holden‟s
supporters varied in their level of disaffection with the Confederacy. While some Western North
Carolinians went so far as to join the Union army, others held more mild Union sentiments. In
other words, many Holden supporters may have claimed to be Unionists, but they were not
willing to join the Union army and fight against their neighbors.
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CONCLUSION
By 1865, most of the South had become occupied by the Union army and it was apparent
that the Confederacy had failed to achieve its independence. As the war came to a close, one
unrepentant Appalachian Confederate wrote from Point Lookout,

When I commenced this diary of my life as a Confederate soldier I was full of hope for
the speedy termination of the war, and our independence. I was not quite nineteen years
old. I am now twenty-three. The four years that I have given to my country I do not
regret, nor am I sorry for one day that I have given - my only regret is that we have lost
that for which we fought. Nor do I for one moment think that we lost it by any other way
than by being outnumbered at least five if not ten to one. The world was open to the
enemy, but shut out to us. I shall now close this diary in sorrow, but to the last I will say
that, although but a private, I still say our Cause was just, nor do I regret one thing that I
have done to cripple the North.250
Many Western North Carolinians likely shared these sentiments. Demonstrating a strong
commitment to the Confederate cause, many highlanders made tremendous sacrifices for their
state and the Confederacy.

With the surrendering of Confederate General Robert E. Lee and Joseph E. Johnston,
Appalachian soldiers, like Louis Leon would return to a much different looking home. In the
spring of 1865, the Civil War had decimated the South. The southern efforts to conduct the war
had exasperated the resources of the South, draining both state economies and the wealth of
private citizens. Historian Claudia Goldin estimated that the war‟s direct cost to both citizens and
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state governments in the South was $3,285,900.00.251 In total, 260,000, thirty percent of
southerners who fought for the Confederacy would not return home, leaving 85,000 women
widowed and 200,000 children fatherless.252 Like the South as a whole, North Carolina
experienced similar devastation. In total, 40,000 men, thirty percent of the 130,000 North
Carolinians who fought were killed.253 Appalachia would equally pay a high for their
participation in the Civil War. The prospering region of mercantile production, tourism, and
farming that existed in the spring of 1861 would be nearly destroyed by four years of warfare.
Gordon McKinney notes that in Appalachia all “agricultural surplus had been consumed, and
livestock herds had been decimated. The transportation infrastructure had been weakened. All
investments in enslaved persons were lost with emancipation.”254 The desolation and destruction
left by the Civil War would take decades to repair. Historian Paul Paskoff concluded that “the
war inflicted severe material damage on the South that had a significant role in setting back the
region‟s economic growth and development.”255

The farming industry would especially be devastated by the war. In North Carolina, the
value of farms and farming in the state would decrease by forty-five percent. Totaling a net
wealth of $143,301,065.00 in 1860, North Carolina‟s farming industry dropped to a value of
$78,211,083 in 1870. In Appalachia, agricultural suffered a similar level of loss. The value of
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farms in Western North Carolina dropped thirty-one percent, from $29,226,507.00 in 1860 to
$20,226,507.00 in 1870.256 Although manufacturing industries in Appalachia saw a twenty-three
percent gain in capital investment, much of the population remained largely unaffected by its
successes.257 With a total population of 235,347 people in 1870, manufacturing positions only
accounted for 2,511persons, approximately two percent of the population. Between 1860 and
1870, the population in Western North Carolina would increase by nearly thirty-eight percent.258
As a result, nearly all viable farm land would become occupied. John Inscoe explains that with
the drop in agricultural prices, “mountain farmers found themselves unable to maintain their
independent ownership of their land.” Throughout Appalachia many former independent farmers
would be forced into tenant farmer agreements, thus losing the rights to their land. The
unfortunate result throughout Appalachia was that there emerged “a large group of identifiably
poor farmers and laborers throughout the region who appeared to have little hope to escape their
impoverished situation.”259 The region which appeared to be on the verge achieving economic
balance and prosperity in 1860 looked starkly different in 1870.

The choices made by Appalachians in 1861 would have lasting effects on their region for
years to come. Although the battles ceased in 1865, the lingering effects of the Civil War lasted
well into the twentieth century. The devastation left by the war stood as evidence to a region that
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sacrificed a great deal for the Confederate cause. To those loyal Appalachian Confederates who
looked back on the war, they would remember the unique bond that existed between themselves
and the Confederate nation.

Throughout the Civil War, a majority of Western North Carolinians remained loyal to the
Confederacy. Any understanding of how Appalachian citizens viewed their relationship to the
Confederacy must be grounded in the secession crisis before the war. The secession crisis played
an integral role in the shaping of Confederate nationalism in Western North Carolina. Initially,
most Appalachian citizens tried to avoid secession and war, believing that time and patience
would lead to a peaceful reconciliation between the regions. In both the presidential election in
the fall of 1861, and the state convention vote in February of 1861, most Western North
Carolinians expressed their desire to stay in the Union. The presidential election results in North
Carolina showed that the Constitutional Unionist candidate John Bell was only narrowly
defeated by Democrat and pro-secessionist candidate John Breckinridge. In the mountains,
citizens were equally as divided over the two candidates, where Unionists showed a strong
output to for Bell. Three months later, Western North Carolinians directly addressed the
secession crisis when they were permitted to vote on whether to have a secession convention.
The majority of Western North Carolinians voted against hosting a secession convention. By
March of 1861 it was apparent that highlanders were not going to accept secession until that time
most Appalachian citizens had resisted the persuasion of secessionist within North Carolina.
However, their long defense of Unionism would soon fall to the wayside in favor to the
Confederacy. The Lincoln administration‟s reaction to Fort Sumter ended virtually all Unionist
sentiment in Appalachia, and replaced it with a surge of Confederate patriotism. Western North
140

Carolinians were outraged over the United States‟ call for troops to invade the Southern
Confederacy. The late date of secession in North Carolina left no doubt among Western North
Carolinians that they exhausted all efforts to avoid secession. In other words, they left the Union
believing that the war was thrown upon them from the North. 260
For most, the complex and layered national identity that was created shortly after Fort
Sumter was powerful enough to weather the conflict. Their will to endure was largely fueled by
the distinct characteristics that made up their identity. The understanding that they were fighting
to protect their homes and communities was a strong incentive to fight. Appalachians believed
that fighting for the Confederacy was the best means to protect their families. But this perception
was reinforced by underlying concepts of revolutionary patriotism, religion, and slavery.
Looking back to their ancestors, many Appalachian Confederates believed their cause was the
second Revolutionary War. Believing that the North was invading the South and trampling on
their freedoms, highlanders thought they were fighting for American democracy. The American
Revolution gave their cause a sense of righteousness, while also portraying the Union as unAmerican. Religion was another potent element of their identity. Religion, like the Revolutionary
patriotism, served a similar purpose for Western North Carolinians. Not only justifying their
cause, religion also gave Confederates strength and a kept morale intact. Studying scripture and
the Bible, Appalachian Confederates often compared their situation to that of other peoples, such
as the Israelites. When the staggering battlefield losses were reported, many Western North
Carolinians believed that God was only testing their will, often times lost battles were met with
calls for more religious piety. Slavery also played a pivotal role as a reason to fight. As it has
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been shown, white non-slaveholders still benefited from a slave society. Antebellum slave
society gave whites a racial supremacy that few Appalachian were willing to give up. It would
be together that these beliefs worked to solidify a Confederate identity which was predominant
among most Appalachian Confederates.261
However, despite having a strong national identity, many loyalists experienced
disaffection. Dissent was frequent among both soldiers and civilians who became disgruntled
over Confederate policies or varying issues associated with the war. Chapter two demonstrated
that civilians and soldiers often expressed their anger over the Confederacy‟s inability to protect
the home front. Throughout the war, speculators, Unionists, the Union army, and deserters all
exacerbated suffering on the home front. With the fall of Knoxville in early 1863, Western North
Carolina would become unprotected from violence. As the Confederacy fumbled at the
opportunity to protect mountain communities, many soldiers deserted. Because, soldiers who
deserted home to protect their families often returned to the army at a later point in the war; this
type of desertion further blurred the lines between loyal and disloyal. Not all deserters were
equally disloyal, in reality; many loyal Confederates were driven to desert because of the
overwhelming need to protect their families.262 Appalachians frequently wrote to Governor
Vance expressing their anger and suffering over the depredations occurring in the mountains. In
chapter three, it was shown that conflicts between Appalachian Confederates and Richmond over
the conscription policies enticed many civilians and soldiers to write Zebulon Vance in protest of
conscription. Anger over conscription would “reveal the stresses” placed upon communities as
well as the difficult task of winning the war. However, resistance to conscription was based upon
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the premises that Appalachian communities did not have any more men to supply the army.263
Despite the prevalence of loyalist in Western North Carolina, the region also held a
significant minority of anti-Confederates. Disloyalty among many highlanders complicated
Confederate war efforts in the region. Confederate dissent in Appalachia was expressed through
a few different examples. Chapter two revealed that many deserters fled the Confederate armies
because they did not wish to fight, which was especially true in the early years of the war. A
great deal of these deserters gravitated back to the mountains where they resorted to violence as a
means to survive. When deserter violence combined with raids led by both Unionist
sympathizers and the Union Army, the will of all Appalachian Confederates would be tested. As
Chapter Four had shown, not all forms of disloyalty were expressed through violence. Perhaps
the greatest threat to Confederate loyalists in North Carolina was the rise the peace movement
led by William Holden. Holden‟s prominence demonstrated how by the middle of the war, many
North Carolinians had given up on the Confederate nation. Holden‟s rise was symbolic of a
major rift between many North Carolinians and the Confederacy. However, just as the 1864
gubernatorial election was symbolic of the increase in disloyalty; it is also a testament to the will
Confederate North Carolinians. With an opportunity to change the course of the war, most North
Carolinians went to the polls and voted to keep fighting in the war. The success of Vance in 1864
underlines how the majority of North Carolinians were unwilling to accept a peace that did not
accommodate Confederate independence.264
When studying Confederate nationalism, one must accept that internal fissures did exist
throughout the South, as they did in Western North Carolina. However, the question remains to
263
264
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be asked, did “internal dissent” cripple the Confederacy and affect its ability to make war? The
answer is largely no. Internal antagonisms between the southern populace and the Confederate
nation were not pronounced enough to crumble the Confederacy from within. In his study on
Virginia Confederates, Historian William Blair asked the thought provoking question, “Although
southern morale had its ups and downs, I wondered what Ulysses S. Grant would have said if
someone had approached him in 1864 and asked if he noticed a lack of national spirit in the
enemy that inflicted 65,000 casualties in the Army of the Potomac.” By asking this rhetorical
question, Blair is alluding to the fact that for over four years the Confederacy managed to wage a
war against a superior nation. This could have only been done by a dedicated people, who had a
strong attachment to their nation. However, despite their tremendous sacrifices, it cannot be
denied that the Confederacy suffered from internal antagonism, but internal strife was not strong
enough to destroy the Confederacy.265
Western North Carolina did not fit neatly into one category of either, loyal or disloyal.
Therefore, this study sought “the middle ground between the two competing historiographical
positions.” Examining identity and nationalism in Western North Carolina has shown that
throughout the war, the region, although mostly loyal, still contained a strong disloyal faction of
citizens. Revealing that both elements of loyalty and disloyalty existed within the South has
advanced our understanding of identity and nationalism within the Confederacy; allowing
historians to move forward from the disloyalty versus loyalty argument. In a recent essay Gary
Gallagher recognized this point when stated that the time has come “to move beyond a binary
approach to questions of disaffection, commitment to the nascent nation, and the like.” Moving
265
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beyond age old argument will allow historians to engage more intricate understanding of the
southern people and their relationship to the Confederacy. By recognizing the existence of
loyalty, disloyalty, and those in between these two poles, this study attempts to move the
historiography into a direction of more complex understanding of the nationalism and identity in
the Confederacy. 266
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